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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the health and labor market effects of spousal and parental 
choices. First chapter of this dissertation studies international marriages in Europe. The effect of 
international marriage - a union between a country native and an immigrant - on social and 
family outcomes is endogenous due to the selection into marriage markets and non-random 
spousal choice. In this paper I use European Union membership and availability of cheap travel 
as region-specific instrumental variables that increased the probability of intermarriage in 
Europe. The two-stage least squares analysis applied to 1977-2006 IPUMS International Project 
Census micro data shows no significant difference in the family size or number of children 
between intermarried and same-nativity couples. However, it does reveal higher labor force 
participation rates and much lower marriage rates among mixed nationality couples.  
In the second chapter, I use Russia’s 1981-82 maternity benefit expansion to estimate the 
long-run effects of maternity leave on health and other outcomes of children. The program was 
rolled out in stages and has extended both partially paid and unpaid leave for the vast majority of 
women. To estimate the effects of the program I apply a difference-in-differences framework to 
the recent 2000-2014 Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data that contain information on 
both affected and unaffected cohorts, while also taking advantage of the fact that not all regions 
implemented the program simultaneously. While the results suggest there is no difference in the 
overall health of individuals that are born before and after the benefit roll-out, there is strong 
evidence that those born after the reform are less likely to have chronic gastrointestinal diseases, 
which could be attributed to better nutrition and breastfeeding duration in the first year of life. 
Third chapter proposes a new way to estimate the effect of maternal labor supply on the 
achievement of children. I use a country-specific measure of gender inequality as an instrumental 
2 
variable for the female immigrant’s decision to work. For the married women in the New 
Immigrant Survey, higher values of the Gender Inequality Index were positively correlated with 
the propensity to work for pay and work longer hours, suggesting their self-selection into the US 
immigration. Two-stage estimates further show that children of working mothers have reading 
and math scores that are over one standard deviation above average. An additional 10 hours a 
week of maternal work is estimated to increase reading scores by 37% relative to mean and 
quantitative reasoning scores by 24% relative to the mean. I also find that working mothers visit 
their children’s classes and attend school meetings more frequently than others; hence, the 
observed improvement in test scores could be due to a higher involvement of parents in their 
child’s school curriculum. 
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CHAPTER 1:                                                                                                                                
Social and Economic Impacts of International Marriages in Europe 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
 Globalization has been a dominant trend in the international relations ever since the end 
of World War II. The increased interdependence between countries has helped open up many 
national borders, start up international enterprises and develop global labor markets. These 
events helped make immigration today as prominent as ever, with a lot of migration flows 
happening between countries that have formal economic and political agreements. The 
proportion of foreign-born individuals residing in countries like Spain, France, Ireland and 
Austria exceeded 10 percent as of 2005.1 Additionally, between the years 1990 and 2010, the UK 
has increased the proportion of immigrants from 6.4% to 11.3% of total population, while Italy 
has more than tripled it, from 2.5 to 7.9%.2  
High dissemination of immigrants would inevitably alter the composition and functioning 
of both labor and marriage markets of the host country, and thus should be of high interest to 
policy-makers. While much of economic research today is focused on issues related to 
immigration, including immigrant assimilation in the host country (Meng and Gregory, 2005), 
marriage and education trade-off (Nielsen, Smith and Çelikaksoy, 2009), and the way immigrant 
population alters the host country’s marriage market conditions (Angrist, 2002), the questions of 
causal effects of intermarriage on family structure and labor market decisions remain 
unanswered. Meanwhile, international marriage (also called intermarriage), defined as the 
formation of families between natives and immigrants, is no longer an unusual phenomenon in 
                                                          
1 OECD Country Statistical Profiles (http://stats.oecd.org/). 
2 UN Population Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, September 2013. 
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many developed countries.3 In this paper, we fill a gap in the existing literature by evaluating 
how intermarriage affects fertility, family formation and size, and the decision to participate in 
the labor market. It is particularly of interest whether intermarriage contributes to the previously 
observed trend in changing marriage structure, less traditional views on children and household 
specialization (Gubernskaya, 2010). 
Given a high correlation between intermarriage and immigrant stock of a given country 
(Lanzieri, 2012), it is intuitive to study the effects of intermarriage in regions with high 
immigrant population. As of 2013, the world average for immigrant stock as a proportion of the 
population is 3.2% overall and 10.8% for developed counties, while for Western Europe it is as 
high as 12.7%.4 This makes Europe an ideal geographical location to study the effects of 
intermarriage.  
This paper is the first to use new instrumental variables to control for existing marriage 
market selection and estimate causal effects of intermarriage. Whether individuals choose their 
own partner or are arranged to marry someone by their families, matching in marriage markets is 
not randomized. Economic theory of marriage markets developed by Becker (1974) predicts 
assortative mating, or the tendency for people to pick their spouses based on their personal traits. 
Additionally, in case of intermarriage, younger and better-educated individuals receive greater 
exposure to other cultures and could therefore become more open-minded towards intermarriage.  
To deal with self-selection in intermarriages we use two stage least squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variables that are unique to our sample and time period. We find that the European 
Union membership, the introduction of Euro and the airline deregulation in any given European 
                                                          
3 The Economist article “Herr and Madame, Senor and Mrs.”, Print Edition, November 12, 2011 
(http://www.economist.com/node/21538103/print). 
4 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 
2013 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013). 
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country are all suitable instruments to deal with endogeneity associated with international 
marriage. These instrumental variables are strongly correlated with intermarriage and are not 
directly correlated with the outcomes, which in this paper are family structure and labor market 
participation of individuals. Our results show that intermarried couples do not have fewer 
children overall, while more recent cohorts tend to have younger children in their household. 
Intermarried people are much more likely to cohabit than those from same-nativity unions, and 
also tend to have significantly higher labor force participation rates. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief literature review in section two, section 
three describes data and econometric methods used in this paper. Section four describes the 
institutional background and provides an overview of our instrumental variables, including the 
mechanism of their work, empirical specifications and the first stage estimate analysis. Section 
five presents IV estimates for the outcome variables. Lastly, section six discusses some of the 
implications and concludes. 
 
 
1.2.  Literature Review 
 
The existing literature on intermarriage generally focuses on assimilation of first- and 
second-generation migrants. Meng and Gregory (2005) use sex ratios and individual probabilities 
of marrying within their ethnic group to show that, in Australia, immigrant women who married 
native men had significantly higher labor force participation and earnings than immigrant women 
who married other immigrants. This could be due to the fact that when two married individuals 
already differ from each other in significant cultural ways, they would be more likely to abandon 
the traditional marital roles as well. Alternatively, presence of a native spouse could increase 
6 
networking opportunities and language skills of incoming immigrants, which in turn would 
speed up their social integration and entry into the job market (Bleakley and Chin, 2010). 
The seminal work of Angrist (2002) looks at 20th Century US immigrants and uses the 
variation in the incoming cohorts’ sex ratios as an instrument for family and labor market 
outcomes. The study used a comprehensive data set, which included the ethnicity of couples, and 
utilized a policy-induced change in the immigration cohort composition as a natural experiment 
to deal with the omitted variables bias and selection issues. Key findings show that in a high-sex 
ratio environment, when marriage markets include more males than females, marriage rates are 
higher for both sexes, female labor force participation decreases, family incomes rise, and the 
welfare of children is increased. The empirical approach of this paper is based on the assumption 
that incoming immigrants are willing to marry only within their ethnicity group, which means 
they marry either first or second-generation immigrants from the same country, and 
intermarriage is not considered an option.  
Levchenko and Solheim (2013) show that migration for marriage increases the 
dissimilarity of intermarried and native couples. Russian-US intermarried couples are 
significantly different from native US couples in their socio-economic characteristics. While this 
analysis is based on one country and a very narrow immigrant population, it shows that people 
select themselves in certain marriage markets, and some of that selection is likely to be 
unobservable to researchers. In cases like these, lack of assortative mating by education in mixed 
couples could be beneficial as it can potentially reduce population income inequality in the long 
run (Greenwood, 2014).  
In other cases, intermarried couples can have similar levels of education and same 
opportunity costs to specializing in home production. Using panel data in Germany Nottmeyer 
7 
(2014) finds that intermarriage is related to less specialization among the cohabiting couples. 
Particularly, native women seem to have more bargaining power and tend to increase their labor 
force participation. On the other hand, intermarried natives specialize more than native couples, 
which might suggest adaptation of more traditional views on marriage.  
Sociology literature provides some intuition on the changing views on specialization and 
marriage observed in these studies. Gubernskaya (2010) looks at Likert scale survey data from 
trends in marriage and children, over multiple European countries, analyzing socio-demographic 
characteristics as predictors for specialization decisions. She finds that across all countries and 
socio-economic groups, opinions on marriage and children become less traditional over time 
(1980s - 2000s). She refers to several main sociological theories behind the attitude change - 
cohort replacement (inter-cohort change), economic modernization (changes in opportunity), 
second demographic transition (SDT) and intra-cohort change. The theories are used to explain 
why women today are more accepting of non-traditional family structures, cohabitation, full-time 
work, childbearing outside of marriage and even childless life.  Our paper tests a potential source 
of these ideological changes by investigating whether the increase of intermarriage is related to 
the non-traditional views on children, marriage and work, or whether it brings mixed-nativity 
couples closer together in their ideological views. 
Lanzieri’s (2012) statistical analysis of mixed marriages in Europe over the last 20 years 
identifies some of the importance and challenges of studying intermarriage, while analyzing 
trends and prevalence of intermarriage across countries. While proportion of intermarriages 
increases for all groups of countries, it is not always for the same reason. Northern European 
countries experience an increase in the mixed marriage rates over his study period but mostly 
due to decreasing marriage rates overall. Eastern European countries, many of which were not 
8 
directly influenced by the EU and the introduction of Euro, have the lowest mixed marriage 
proportions of the whole region, with some countries showing an increase and others having a 
stable trend in proportion of intermarriages.   
In another special regional case, countries like Switzerland and Luxembourg have 
substantially more international marriages, all due to small population, multiple national 
languages and limited opportunities on the marriage market. Lanzieri (2012) also used a self-
constructed endogamy/exogamy measure and concluded that for European region overall, the 
attitude toward marriage is weakly endogamous or indifferent. In other words, people generally 
marry within their nationality, but do not limit themselves to natives only, especially if their 
national market has size or sex ratio restrictions, or if there are many foreigners residing locally. 
These findings confirm the relevance of our instruments in this paper; the increased number of 
foreigners due to political and economic unions in Europe would increase opportunities for 
mixed friendships and marriages. 
 In a related analysis, Esteve et al. (2011) looks at cross-border marriage formation as 
related to the number of foreigners present in the host country. Like Lanzieri (2012), the paper 
finds high correlation between the number of foreigners and number of mixed marriages, but the 
elasticity is higher for immigrant women and lower for immigrant men. Both Lanzieri (2012) 
and Esteve et al (2011) set a good background for the analysis of intermarriage, but such 
demographic literature does not provide causal inference on its determinants or its social and 
labor market effects on the host country, which is another literature gap we fill in this paper. 
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1.3. Instrumental Variables 
In this study, we look at the European Union, Eurozone and the deregulation of airlines 
within Europe as economic initiatives that ended up promoting business and personal 
relationships across the country borders. Next, we describe the chosen instrumental variables, the 
mechanism of their work on the increased prevalence of international marriages and their 
independence from household and labor market characteristics. 
Since we are working with survey data and want to establish the effect of a particular 
type of marriage on family and labor outcomes, ordinary least squares and binary econometric 
models will be biased by selection. One way to deal with endogeneity is to include relevant 
instrumental variables. If instrumental variables are strongly correlated with the endogenous 
variable and at the same time are not directly correlated with the outcomes, unbiased estimates 
can be obtained. We believe that the formation of political and economic unions among 
neighboring countries provides a good instrument for marriage market selection. Such unions are 
typically formed to pursue mutual economic growth and other macroeconomic goals; they 
promote business and tourism volume among the participating countries without directly 
targeting individual and family outcomes. 
 The European Union (EU) started out as a European Coal and Steel Community between 
only six countries; a few decades later the community has developed into a single market 
economic and political zone made up of 28 countries.5 The close diplomatic relations of the 
European countries were written into a law first in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris, then in 1957 
                                                          
5 As of 2015 European Union member countries included Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
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with the Treaty of Rome, and later in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht, all of which expanded 
the membership and legislative power of the union.6 
Introduced later in 1999 as the common currency of the European Union, the Euro has 
eliminated exchange rate costs and increased business and trade among participating countries 
(Micco, Ordonez and Stein 2003, Bun and Klaassen 2002, Berger and Nitsch 2005, Flam and 
Nordström 2006, Chintrakarn 2008). It was a much-anticipated next step in the further 
integration of the European Union countries. With the United Kingdom and Denmark as the only 
exceptions7, each member of the EU had to start accepting Euro as their new common currency, 
or pledge to accept it at a later date. As of 2015, 19 out of 28 European Union member states 
have adopted Euro as their currency.8 
To see relative change in trade patterns of EU member states following the 1993 Treaty 
of Maastricht and 1999 Eurozone establishment we can refer to OECD country profile statistics. 
As an example, Spain saw an increase in its exports (as a percent of GDP) from 16% in 1992 to 
over 20% in 1994. Likewise, Slovenia, a country that entered EU in 2004 and Eurozone in 2007, 
had the GDP share of its exports increase from 50% in 2003 to 64% in 2006.9 In fact, all of the 
countries that adopted Euro in 1999 saw a substantial increase in their import and export share.  
In the first stage of our analysis, we propose that the increase in trade and business 
connections between the EU countries has contributed to the formation of personal relationships. 
In addition to that, the incorporation of the earlier Schengen agreement into European Union law 
has made it possible to easily travel between the member states and maintain those close 
                                                          
6 Official website of the European Union (http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/). 
7 They have negotiated an opt-out from otherwise mandatory adaptation of the Euro according to the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992. 
8 Seven countries in process of adopting Euro include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden and Croatia. Official website of the European Union (http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/money/euro/) 
9 OECD Country Statistical Profiles (http://stats.oecd.org/). 
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relationships, leading to more friendships and marriages.10 Figure 1-1 uses data collected for this 
research to plot time series graphs showing the proportion of international marriages across 
different countries of the European Union. Green and red lines indicate a year in which a country 
has become an EU and a Eurozone member, respectively. It is easy to see that for all EU 
members the proportion of intermarriages has gone up, especially following the membership 
entry. In contrast, Figure 1-2 shows that for countries that are not members of the EU (for the 
time period studied here) intermarriage rates have remained stable or have decreased.11 
To act as an instrumental variable for purposes of this research, European Union must not 
only be highly correlated with formation of personal relationships, but also be exogenous to our 
outcomes of interest. European Union was primarily established to end military conflicts and 
promote peace and prosperity between European countries, and therefore its integration policies 
did not target specific social outcomes like fertility and within-family specialization. In the 
1970s, the EU was increasing funding and infrastructure for poorer regions of its member 
countries to decrease unemployment, but it was only in the 2000s that it began targeting female 
labor force participation.12 
 Another major event that happened in Europe and has also increased travel was the 
government deregulation of airlines in 1997. Prior to deregulation, European airlines had limited 
control over their flight routes and faced many price restrictions, much like US airlines prior to 
their deregulation in 1978. EU started easing air travel policies in 1993, and four years later the 
initiatives have allowed formation of smaller and cheaper airlines. Those airlines could operate 
freely in EU member states, often had only a few main bases and made money travelling short 
                                                          
10 We considered using Schengen Agreement as another instrumental variable; however, the census dates and 
countries fully overlap with the Eurozone membership in our sample. 
11 Switzerland had a large proportion of intermarriages at the beginning of the studied period and it grew steadily 
after that. However, this country is a special case as noted earlier on page 6. 
12 In the last 15 years, development programs such as Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 have aimed to increase LFP 
in European countries. Specifically, the initiatives target female LFP by improving access to childcare facilities. 
12 
routes to neighboring countries. Some of the first “economy” airlines that were established 
around the deregulation period are still popular today, i.e. Ryan Air and EasyJet. This much 
more affordable and faster transportation provided another gateway for Europeans and foreigners 
to travel and expand their personal and business networks. 
 
1.4. Data and Empirical Model 
1.4.1. Data and Sample 
 Our individual-level data comes from the IPUMS International Project of University of 
Minnesota, which was a result of a collaboration of the Minnesota Population Center, National 
Statistical Offices, and international data archives.13 The project is a collection of publicly 
available international census data, currently counting over 250 country-year samples. Sample 
sizes and availability vary, with some countries represented at less than 1% due to data 
availability (i.e. India, Indonesia, Nigeria) or only a few thousand households due to country size 
(i.e. Fiji, Saint Lucia). However, most developed countries, European ones in particular, are 
represented at 10% of population with over 500,000 households. Provided variables include 
household characteristics such as geographical location and constructed family interrelationships, 
as well as a variety of individual level data on nativity, education and occupational status. 
We use samples of countries that at present are members of the European Union, as well 
as countries that directly neighbor with the EU region.14 Completeness of survey data on at least 
one of the national origin variables, age, occupation and education is the primary criteria for our 
sample selection. Additionally, we needed the surveys to have comparable education and 
                                                          
13 Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-
readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014. (https://international.ipums.org/international/) 
14 Data on the European Union and Eurozone membership status for the countries in my sample was collected from 
the official website of the European Union (http://europa.eu/). 
13 
occupation variables to serve as controls in the regressions. In the end, our individual and 
household level data come from 11 countries that fit our selection criteria: Austria, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey. Except for 
Slovenia and Italy, each country is represented by two or more Census years spanning from 1977 
to 2006.  The first two columns of Table 1 list the 29 samples used here and the original Census 
population fractions of each one. Census fractions for my data selection range from 4.2 to 33% 
of the population, with the majority of samples represented by either 5% or 10% fractions. 
For each of the samples we indicate if a country was a member of European Union, 
Eurozone or had their airlines deregulated in their census year.15 For example, in Table 1-1 we 
can see that in Greece was part of the EU in census year 1991, but it was not part of Eurozone 
nor did it have airline deregulation at that time. However, by the time 2001 census surveys were 
collected, Greece was part of all three groups. 
The IPUMS International project provides a constructed variable on the location of 
spouse or cohabiting spouse within the household for each surveyed individual, which is how we 
are able to identify and link together all couples. We then define intermarriage, as a variable 
equal to 1 if within a married or cohabiting couple one person is foreign-born and one is native-
born in the country. The variable is constructed mainly from the information on nativity, which 
distinguishes people born in the country of survey from those who are migrants. If nativity status 
is missing for any given sample, we redefine intermarriage based on country of birth or 
citizenship status. Likewise, intramarried, or same nativity, couples are identified when one of 
the partners is native-born, or both partners are foreign-born and from the same country of 
origin.  
                                                          
15 Data on cheap flight routes following the deregulation was collected on airline and travel websites, primarily 
https://www.ryanair.com/us/en/, http://www.easyjet.com/en, https://www.ricksteves.com/travel-
tips/transportation/budget-flights.  
14 
We ultimately want to compare individuals in intermarried unions to those from 
homogeneous unions, regardless whether those same-nativity couples come from native or 
immigrant families. Second to last column of Table 1 lists the proportion of intermarried 
individuals in each country-year sample. Average proportion of intermarried people in our 
estimation sample is 5.32% of the married or cohabiting population, which varies among year-
country groups from less than 1 percent in Greece 1981 and Romania 2002 to over 16 percent in 
Switzerland 1990 and Ireland 2002. 
We keep only those individual observations that we can link to a spouse or a cohabiting 
partner. Only group that we specifically exclude are individuals in the armed forces, since only 
some of the country surveys identify them in a population. After taking a 15% random sample of 
total available linked observations in order to compress the data to a manageable size, our final 
estimation sample size consists of 2,547,735 individuals. Last column of Table 1-1 shows how 
many observations come from each of the census samples.  
 
1.4.2. Empirical Specification 
To address the potential endogeneity of intermarriage, we estimate the first stage 
equation as below: 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝐸𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡 + 𝜁𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡   (1) 
where intermar is an indicator variable whether or not individual i in region r of country c is 
intermarried in the survey year t. Our instrumental variable is represented by Ect. Variable Ect = 1 
if country c is part of the EU in year t or if country c has access to cheap flights. Trend 
specification (Trendct) varies by census year and country, and is included as linear, quadratic or 
country-specific. The last component of the equation is a regional fixed effect 𝜁𝑟, which is also 
used for clustering in the regressions. Regions are defined at the ENUTS3 level - European 
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Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 3 - the third narrowest level within countries, or 
smallest geographical category available. 
Controls 𝑋𝑖 include indicator variables for age, education and occupation groups. Age 
groups are 12-18, 19-25, 26-35, 36-45 and over 46. Education variable is standardized across all 
European countries and is categorized into primary, secondary and university levels, with less 
than primary as the base category. Occupations are grouped in 9 general categories, which 
include legislators and officials, professionals, technicians, clerks, service workers, agricultural 
and fishery, crafts and trade, plant and machine operators and elementary occupations.  
Table 1-2 shows sample statistics as well statistics for sub-samples as by intermarriage 
status. The difference in socio-demographic variable means confirms the presence of self-
selection in a marriage market. Comparing some characteristics of intermarried individuals with 
those married endogamously, or within their nationality, it appears that the two groups differ 
from each other in significant ways. Intermarried people are slightly younger than their 
counterparts, have higher rates of university completion and are more likely to hold professional 
and managerial jobs. 
The dependent variables of interest in this paper are family formation and labor force 
participation. These variables are likely to be affected by the type marriage, and are of high 
policy interest. Outcome variables include number of own children living in the household, 
number of children under five, official marital status and overall family size, as well as labor 
market participation. Comparing simple means of subgroups by marriage type in Table 1-2, we 
see statistically fewer children and smaller family sizes for intermarried individuals. Labor force 
participation rates are over 5 percentage points higher for those who are intermarried. There is 
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also a dramatic difference in the cohabitation rates – proportion of intermarried couples that are 
not officially married is 13.3%, more than double the sample average of 6.6%. 
Equation 2 outlines the second stage for estimating the causal effect of intermarriage on 
the outcome variables as follows: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟̂ 𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡 + 𝜁𝑟 + 𝜐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡   (2) 
 
 Instrumental variables are used in Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions for 
continuous outcomes and Two Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) is used for binary outcomes 
including labor force participation and an indicator variable for cohabiting, or not being officially 
married. 2SRI is an instrumental variables method that is an alternative to 2SLS and designed 
and proved consistent specifically for binary outcome models (Terza 2009). Instead of using 
predicted endogenous variables in the second stage, the method proposes using the true 
endogenous variable values and the residual values from the first stage. The model then follows 
equation 3: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑡 +  𝜁𝑟 + 𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡  (3) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑡̂  
Using 2SRI instead of the Two Stage Least Squares results in a more intuitive interpretation of 
estimates if we are estimating intermarriage effects on binary outcomes. Residual inclusion 
method not only restricts the estimates to be between 0 and 1, like a regular probit, but also 
controls for endogenous variables, like a 2SLS regression.  For comparison with instrumental 
variables estimates, we run ordinary least squares (OLS) for continuous and Probit regressions 
for binary outcomes, all while controlling for the same set of independent variables, regional 
fixed effects and time trends as in equation (1). 
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1.5. Results 
1.5.1. First Stage 
Table 1-3 shows results under three different specifications of the trend variable. Overall, 
our estimates are robust across different trend specifications. Panel A shows that the European 
Union increased the prevalence of intermarriage by about 4.5 to 5 percentage points, or 85-95 
percent compared to the overall sample mean of 5.3%. Likewise, Eurozone membership 
increased the probability of being intermarried by 2.5 percentage points (Panel B). Compared to 
the overall mean, this is a sizeable, almost a 50% increase. Panel C shows the estimate of the 
Airline deregulation reform, and suggests that the presence of a cheap airline has increased the 
probability of intermarriage by 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points.  
The estimates in Panel B and Panel C are similar in magnitudes; therefore, we combine 
Eurozone and cheap airline availability to form a single instrumental variable (cheap travel 
hereafter). Countries that have switched to the Euro and have also gained access to cheap air 
travel experienced a significant reduction in travel and international business transaction costs 
through both of these reforms. More importantly, the treatment groups of Eurozone and cheap 
airline instruments in our data differ by only 2 country-year samples.16 Panel D shows that the 
formation of the Eurozone and the availability of cheap airline travel have increased the 
intermarriage rates in the region. 
 
1.5.2. OLS/Probit and 2SLS/2SRI  
 Main estimates of intermarriage effects on linear and binary outcomes are outlined in 
tables 1-4 and 1-5 respectively. In those tables, columns 1 through 3 report OLS/Probit estimates 
                                                          
16 Switzerland in 2000 had access to cheap airlines but was not part of the Euro zone; Greece in 2001 was part of the 
Euro zone but did not have cheap travel routes outside of the country. 
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of intermarriage, columns 4 through 6 show intermarriage effects as instrumented with EU 
membership, while columns 7 through 9 show estimates from intermarriage effects instrumented 
with cheap travel. Equations 2 and 3 were estimated on the full sample first and then on the 
subsamples stratified by sex, nativity and both sex and nativity variables. All estimations are 
performed with the set of full controls, regional fixed effects, regional clusters, and three types of 
trend variables to insure the robustness of the results. 
 
Intermarriage effects with EU instrument 
 Table 1-4 summarizes results for the linear outcomes as estimated with least squares and 
just-identified 2SLS with two separate IVs, EU and cheap travel variables. First we look at 
family size and composition variables. While OLS suggests that intermarriage leads to 0.11 
fewer kids (which is 8% relative to the mean of 1.4) and therefore smaller family sizes, two stage 
least squares with the EU instrument show that there are no statistically significant effects on 
number of children, number of younger children or family size due to intermarriage. 
Tables 1-5-1 and 1-5-2 report Probit and 2SRI estimates for binary outcomes. Both tables report 
estimation results from equation 3; marginal effects are presented in table 1-5-1, while 
conditional predicted probabilities are shown in Table 1-5-2. In panel A of columns 1 to 3 of 
both tables, probit estimation shows a slight decrease in labor force participation for the overall 
sample. On the contrary, IV regressions in columns 4 to 6 show a significant 42-percentage point 
increase in predicted LFP probability due to intermarriage. This estimate is also consistent across 
linear, quadratic and country-specific trend specifications.  
Panel B in Table 1-5-1 shows the predicted probabilities for couples to cohabitate as 
opposed to officially marry, conditioning on the type of their marriage. Probit marginal effects in 
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first three columns show a small 0.01 percentage point increase in that probability for 
intermarried individuals, a predicted probability increase from 6.5 to 7.9% (Table 1-5-2). Using 
either IV in 2SRI estimation reveals a much more dramatic increase in cohabitation probability 
from around 6% to as high as 80-90%.17 
Appendix table 1-A1 checks the robustness of these estimates by using alternative 
specifications of regional trends in equations 2 and 3, as well as by using an alternative sample 
specification. First column of 1-A1 reports estimates from an equation that uses ENUTS1 
regional definition, which results in larger and fewer total regions than ENUTS3. The second 
column regression uses country fixed effects, resulting in even fewer regional dummies. Finally, 
last column of table 1-A1 reports estimates based on a more homogeneous sample that excludes 
Turkey. The magnitudes of the estimates from all three regressions differ slightly from previous 
specifications, but are consistent with the main model results in terms of their signs and 
statistical significance.  
 
Intermarriage Effects Instrumented with Cheap Travel 
The main difference between the 2SLS regressions using two different instrumental 
variables lies in the estimated effect on the number of children in the household. When using 
cheap travel, a union of Eurozone members and countries affected by airline deregulation, we 
obtain a significant estimate of 0.9 to 1.3 more of younger children for intermarried households. 
This contrasts the no effect found for a cohort affected by the EU membership. The two cohorts 
are about a decade apart in the timing of their exposure to the instruments and the mechanism of 
                                                          
17 Estimation results using alternative specifications of regional fixed effects, ENUTS1 and country-specific, as well 
as estimates from a sample excluding Turkey, are consistent with the main results and are reported in appendix 
Table A-1. 
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their work.18 Therefore, it is not surprising that we see a different estimate of the effect of 
intermarriage on the number of younger kids. Cohorts affected by cheap travel in the late 1990s 
had better labor force participation opportunities, family and career outlooks than cohorts 
affected by EU memberships before 1990s, and were hence more likely to postpone childbearing 
to a later phase in life.  
 Large positive effects of intermarriage on labor force participation and probability of 
cohabitation still hold when we use cheap travel instrument. While the magnitude of LFP 
participation probability change remains unchanged, estimated probability increase for 
cohabitation is now as high as 80-87 percentage point change, compared to 53-81 percentage 
point change range estimated with EU membership instrument. This is also in line with a 
different, more open-minded social environment in the 1990s as compared to 1980s.  
 
Intermarriage Effects by Subgroups 
To identify where the main intermarriage effects might stem from, we stratify the 
estimation sample by population subgroups such as sex, nativity, and both sex and nativity. Since 
our results are robust across different trend specifications in Tables 1-4 and 1-5, only results with 
a linear trend are reported below. While there was no effect of intermarriage on the number of 
children in the overall sample, immigrants who marry a native tend to have 1.3 more children 
than immigrants who intra-marry (Table 1-6, Panel A). Additionally, immigrant males who 
marry native women tend to have more pre-school children at the time of survey than those who 
marry immigrant women, which suggests that they are likely have children later in life (Table 1-
6, Panel B). 
                                                          
18 Earliest Census sample to be a member of European Union in my data is Greece 1981, while the earliest Census 
with cheap travel is France 1999. 
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The increase in the probability to participate in the labor market does not hold for 
intermarried immigrants; estimates in panel D actually show there is a small 12-percentage point 
decrease in probability that immigrant males participate in the labor market when they marry to 
native women. The intermarriage effect on LFP is largest for native females.  
The decrease in marriage rates due to intermarriage holds for both males and females, but 
does not hold for immigrant population. Strongest effect stem from native females who marry 
immigrants; they are 88.4 percentage points more likely to live together with their partners 
without marriage than those who choose another native (Table 1-6, Panel E). Smallest effect 
among the native males is less statistically significant but is still substantial – 55.1 percentage 
point increase in probability of cohabitation if their partner is an immigrant, as compared to those 
with native partners.  
 
Intermarriage effects within and outside of Europe  
To investigate the effects of intermarriage further we separate the endogenous variable 
into two sub-types – marriage between a native and a resident of another European country, and 
marriage between a native and an immigrant from outside Europe. Due to increased cultural 
integration in the EU region intermarriage between citizens of member countries may have less 
social and immigration challenges than intermarriages with citizens outside of EU. Both EU and 
cheap flight are used in the same regression in order to instrument for two endogenous 
variables.  
Panel A of Table 1-7 shows that while both instruments are suitable to be used together 
(F-test is >10), EU instrument is responsible for variation in intermarriage within Europe while 
Cheap travel causes variation in intermarriages outside of Europe. Two instrument 2SLS 
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analysis reported in Panel B of Table 1-7 does not reveal differential trends on number of 
children or family sizes of intermarried couples either within or outside Europe. Intermarriages 
outside Europe have 1.4-1.7 more of young children than same-nativity couples. Overall, the 
labor supply effect holds for both types of intermarried couples, but it is stronger for those 
intermarried outside of Europe. The higher probability to cohabit rather than marry seems to be 
stemming from intermarried Europeans; they are 66-80 percentage points more likely to be 
cohabiting than the natives. 
 
1.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Intermarried individuals stand out from others in the population due to clear observable 
differences in the structure of their family and organization of their work life. This appears to 
stem, at least partially, from intermarriage itself. Instrumental variables analysis in this paper 
confirms that some of the observed differences are due to intermarriage, while others are simple 
correlations resulting from selection. Main social effects of intermarriage are in the labor market 
behaviors of partners, and not in the fertility or family structure. The higher labor supply of 
intermarried native females found here is consistent with the analysis of Nottmeyer (2014), 
which suggests higher bargaining power should decrease specialization within the household. 
Another key result of this study is that intermarried couples do not have fewer children 
than native couples. However, for more recent cohorts, they tend to have younger children that 
are under school age, which means they have children later in life, compared to native or 
immigrant families. The results are consistent with the later marriage trend observed in many 
countries (Gubernskaya, 2010). Also supportive of the previous literature is the observed trend 
for intermarried couples to cohabitate as opposed to marry. Cohabitation not uncommon in most 
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developed countries.19 It reflects the lower return to early marriage and the preference for 
pursuing career and personal goals before settling down. Higher labor force participation rates 
for both men and women would confirm this theory. In case of intermarriage, it is also possible 
that certain cultural barriers prevent couples from tying the knot. Another explanation could lie 
in the structure of the EU itself: in presence of open borders, same currency and similar social 
policy, there may be little added benefit to formalize a personal relationship with marriage.  
The findings in this paper have useful policy implications. Lately, EU has focused more 
and more on bringing all of its member countries up to common economic standards, which 
includes higher labor force participation in particular. Programs like the unsuccessful Lisbon 
Strategy and ongoing Europe 2020 focus on female LFP in particular by increasing the number 
and quality of childcare facilities. Intermarriage provides another channel through which EU 
countries could achieve higher LFP, and thus policies to promote assimilation of single 
immigrants would be beneficial for EU’s economic goals. However, one must also consider the 
potential spillovers of the LFP effects. Higher female labor force participation, and thus a lesser 
degree of spousal specialization, could mean higher household incomes but less time spent with 
children. 
 We have identified the causal effects of intermarriage on the family structure and labor 
market participation decisions of European couples. While questions about the exact mechanism 
of intermarriage remain unanswered, our findings are a first stepping-stone to more research on 
the subject, which would eventually help create better immigration and social policies in the EU 
countries. As globalization increases the number of migrants, it also influences the attitudes of 
the native and immigrant communities in the host country (Lanzieri 2012), which in turn affects 
                                                          
19 In OECD-25 countries, between 2006 and 2011, 6.8% of the population age 20 and over are cohabiting, versus 
49.9% who are married and 15.2% that are single. (OECD Family Database, SF3.3: Cohabitation rate and 
prevalence of other forms of partnership) 
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the prevalence of international marriages. This and other research on intermarriage outcomes can 
lessen the stigma against mixed marriages, promote European integration and further 
diversification of European countries. 
Despite the large scale of the IPUMS data and innovative instrumental variables used in 
this paper, there is still a great need for micro data with comprehensive measures of the ethnicity 
and migration. Future research could explore other instrumental variables or survey intermarried 
couples directly to get a better idea of why their family and work decisions deviate from the 
norm.  
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Figure 1-1: Proportion of International Marriages in the EU Member Countries 
 
 
Notes: Green Line indicates country’s entry into the European Community or the European Union.  
Red line indicates year of Euro Zone establishment, 1999. Source: Own data analysis using STATA, 
data from IPUMS International Project 1977-2006 (COLOR NEEDED) 
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Figure 1-2: Proportion of International Marriages in the EU Non-Member Countries 
 
 
Notes: Red line indicates year of Euro Zone establishment, 1999. Source: Own data analysis using  
STATA, data from IPUMS International Project 1977-2006 
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Table 1-1: Proportion of Intermarried by Country-Year Sample 
IPUMS      
Sample 
Census 
Fraction 
(%) 
 Census     
Size 
Group Membership Sample 
Proportion of 
Intermarried 
Sample 
Totals EU Eurozone 
Cheap 
Flights 
Austria 1991 10 780,512       2.55 53,017 
Austria 2001 10 803,471    10.26 55,593 
France 1990 4.2 2,360,854     11.03 168,809 
France 1999 5 2,934,758    11.21 170,969 
France 2006 33 19,973,287    12.32 156,921 
Greece 1981 10 923,108     0.95 70,767 
Greece 1991 10 951,875     1.67 73,621 
Greece 2001 10 1,028,884    6.68 76,275 
Ireland 1986 10 355,020     9.59 18,807 
Ireland 1991 10 353,149     10.54 18,992 
Ireland 1996 10 365,323     9.98 20,516 
Ireland 2002 10 410,688    16.67 23,216 
Ireland 2006 10 440,314    14.83 26,079 
Italy 2001 5 2,990,739    4.58 186,566 
Portugal 1981 5 492,289       2.52 35,068 
Portugal 1991 5 491,755     3.98 36,755 
Portugal 2001 5 517,026    6.48 40,393 
Romania 1977 10 1,937,021       2.44 123,526 
Romania 1992 10 2,238,578       1.10 169,878 
Romania 2002 10 2,137,967       0.90 164,866 
Slovenia 2002 10 179,632       9.82 12,409 
Spain 1991 5 1,931,458     2.72 135,932 
Spain 2001 5 2,039,274    4.16 142,032 
Switzerland 1980 5 317,803       15.24 22,586 
Switzerland 1990 5 342,797       16.89 25,158 
Switzerland 2000 5 364,086      17.67 26,478 
Turkey 1985 5 2,554,364       1.76 118,205 
Turkey 1990 5 2,864,207       1.55 163,209 
Turkey 2000 5 3,244,456       1.48 211,092 
Overall           5.32 2,547,735 
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Table 1-2: IPUMS Summary Statistics 
  
Sample 
Mean 
Sample Mean by      
Marriage Type Mean 
Difference 
T-test 
Statistic 
VARIABLES International Other 
Panel A: Outcomes           
Number of own children 1.396 1.145 1.410 -0.265*** -69.29 
Number of own children under 5 0.267 0.272 0.267 0.005*** 3.01 
Family size 3.781 3.3 3.808 -0.513*** -96.11 
In the labor force 0.593 0.646 0.590 0.056*** 40.03 
Cohabiting (not married) 0.066 0.133 0.062 0.071*** 100.85 
Panel B: Individual Controls           
Age 12-18 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.002*** -12.89 
Age 19-25 0.062 0.049 0.063 -0.014*** -20.69 
Age 26-35 0.218 0.239 0.216 0.023*** 19.71 
Age 36-45 0.233 0.258 0.232 0.026*** 22.02 
Age 46 + 0.483 0.453 0.485 -0.033*** -23.39 
Less than primary school 0.216 0.114 0.222 -0.107*** -93.7 
Primary school 0.458 0.385 0.462 -0.077*** -55.11 
Secondary school 0.237 0.315 0.233 0.082*** 68.91 
University degree 0.087 0.188 0.0813 0.107*** 136.67 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 0.038 0.058 0.037 0.022*** 40.21 
Professionals 0.048 0.087 0.046 0.042*** 70.1 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 0.053 0.096 0.051 0.045*** 71.64 
Clerks 0.045 0.065 0.044 0.022*** 37.15 
Service workers 0.070 0.089 0.069 0.02*** 27.71 
Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers 0.105 0.02 0.109 -0.089*** -104.89 
Crafts and related trades workers 0.091 0.078 0.092 -0.014*** -17.27 
Plant and machine operators and 
assembly 0.056 0.055 0.056 -0.001 -1.27 
Elementary occupations 0.041 0.042 0.041 -0.001 -1.32 
Unemployed / Not in the labor force 0.399 0.376 0.401 -0.024*** -17.73 
N   135,524 2,412,211     
Notes: Stars indicate significance levels ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 * p<0.1     
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Table 1-3: The Effect of Country Memberships on the Proportions of Intermarriages 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Linear Trend Quadratic Trend Country Trend 
Panel A       
European Union 0.0451*** 0.0450*** 0.0492*** 
  (0.00460) (0.00408) (0.00486) 
Panel B       
Euro 0.0281*** 0.0275*** 0.0238*** 
  (0.00320) (0.00365) (0.00517) 
Panel C       
Cheap Flights 0.0187*** 0.0159*** 0.0172*** 
  (0.00385) (0.00395) (0.00488) 
Panel D       
Cheap Travel 0.0287*** 0.0280*** 0.0215*** 
(Euro or Cheap Flights) (0.00301) (0.00338) (0.00476) 
        
Observations 2,547,735 2,547,735 2,547,735 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, stars indicate significance levels *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each panel and column is a separate regression with full controls and 
regional fixed effects, clustered at the regional ENUTS3 level. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table 1-A1: Two Stage Least Squares and Residual Inclusion Estimates: 
Alternative Specifications 
  (1)   (2)   (3)    
  
ENUTS1 
Regional Fixed 
Effects 
  
Country Fixed 
Effects 
  
Sample 
Excludes 
Turkey 
   
Panel A:  -0.843   -0.888   -0.925    
Number of Children (1.036)   (1.320)   (1.448) 
   
            
   
Observations 2,547,735   2,547,735   2,055,229    
Panel B:  0.422***   0.422***   0.290**    
LFP (0.00147)   (0.00126)   (0.122) 
   
            
   
Observations 2,424,209   2,424,209   1,931,703    
Panel C: 0.667***   0.712*   0.668***    
Not Married (0.250)   (0.375)   (0.123) 
   
            
   
Observations 2,315,520   2,315,520   1,823,014    
St. Errors clustered by: ENUTS1   Country   ENUTS3    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, stars indicate significance levels *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column is a separate regression with EU instrument, full controls and 
a linear time trend. 
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CHAPTER 2:                                                                                                                           
Maternity Leave and Long-Run Health Outcomes of Children:                                                  
Insights from Soviet Russia 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
Maternity leave provides working mothers with an opportunity to spend time off with a 
newborn without worrying about their job security and loss of income. Growing labor force 
participation among women and the persistence of traditional gender roles within the family have 
secured rights to paid leave after birth as a standard component of employment policy across the 
globe. In fact, only two countries remain that do not mandate paid leave after childbirth – Papa 
New Guainía and the United States.20 Despite the US female labor force participation growth 
from 33% in the 1950 to as high as 60% in the late 1990s21, the only federal maternity leave 
legislation was Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, which guaranteed 12 unpaid 
weeks of leave following child birth or adoption. Moreover, while division of labor between 
spouses is reported to be much more equal than it was in 1960s, women in the US spend twice as 
much time on childcare than men.22   
Specific maternal investments during early childhood are hard to identify and measure, 
and there is mixed evidence on whether there are long-run benefits to a mandate of prolonged 
paid maternity leave that would outweigh its explicit costs to the payer, implicit costs to the 
economy and as well as any potential spill-over costs (Gruber 1994, Ruhm 1998).23 Due to 
                                                          
20 International Labour Organization 2014 Report. 
21 Seasonally Adjusted Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate – Women, 16 and older, reported by US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
22 In 1965 women spent 42 hours per week on housework and childcare, while men spent only 6.5 hours per week. 
In 2011, it was 32 and 17 hours for women and men, respectively. For childcare in particular, women spent 14 hours 
a week while men spent only 7. (Data from Pew Research analysis of the American Time Use Survey,  
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/03/14/modern-parenthood-roles-of-moms-and-dads-converge-as-they-
balance-work-and-family/) 
23 In a study of European countries following their extension of paid maternity leave, Ruhm (1998) sees an increase 
in female employment but a decrease in wages relative to a male comparison group. Gruber (1994) studied state-
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scarce availability of relevant individual level data long-term health effects of maternity leave 
have not been studied until now. This paper fills the gap in the existing literature by looking at 
health and behavioral outcomes of the affected children when they are 25 and older.  
Using the difference-in-differences analysis, this study employs a quasi-experimental 
setting of the 1980s maternity leave expansion in Russia to provide first estimates of the positive 
effects of prolonged paid maternity leave on health of children when they are grown up. The 
policy was introduced in different regions of the country at different times, and has ultimately 
extended paid leave from 2 to 12 months after birth, and job-protected unpaid leave from 12 to 
18 months for all working women in the USSR. I use Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
data to select a sample of adults born 5 years before and after the maternity leave expansion, for 
whom I can observe perceived health, health utilization and health behaviors, as well as 
educational attainment and wages. We find that longer maternity leave reduced the incidence of 
chronic gastro-intestinal diseases by 8-9 percentage points, or over 80% of the population mean. 
Several transmission channels should be considered when studying the impacts of 
maternity leave on children's long-run outcomes. Figure 2-1 outlines how maternity leave may 
influence outcomes in the short-run, and considers the outcomes that would subsequently be 
affected in the long-run. Maternity leave directly affects mother's behavior around the time of 
childbirth. Even before the baby is born, leave eligibility reduces maternal stress by insuring job 
security and/or temporary income. This leads to better birth outcomes such as lower infant 
mortality and higher birth weights (Ruhm 2000; Rossin 2011). After birth, take up of maternity 
leave means more available time for the new mother, which she can allocate either towards 
taking care of herself or her child. While there is evidence that new mothers who work longer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
specific health insurance mandates and found that employers offset higher cost of insuring women of childbearing 
age by decreasing their wages.  
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hours have higher levels of stress, depressive symptoms and lower self-reported health, it does 
not seem to correlate with parenting quality (Chatterji et al. 2013). The additional time spent 
with children, however, translates to higher probability to breastfeed (Huang and Yang 2015). 
Breastfeeding has been shown to support baby’s immune system and is highly advocated for by 
all major government health organizations24, even though there is no consistent evidence that its 
benefits have causal interpretation (Evenhouse and Reilly 2005; Baker and Milligan 2008; 
Fletcher 2011; Rothstein 2013)25.  
Finally, there are other parental investments that occur during the maternity leave that are 
hard to self-report and measure. Maternity leave expansions have aided in exploring relationship 
between early childcare and long-term educational and labor market outcomes of the affected 
children. To date, findings suggest either no effect or small effects of extended leave on 
education levels or wages (Dustman and Schoenberg 2011, Carneiro et al. 2015). 
A reduction in the prevalence of chronic gastro-intestinal diseases found in this paper 
combined with evidence from the medical literature suggests that breastfeeding may be an 
important determinant for health later in life. In the next section, I discuss the policy background 
and relevant literature, and explore how the importance of breastfeeding is a suggestive 
conclusion. Section 2.3 discusses data and main empirical model, then section 2.4 outlines 
results for all outcomes. Section 2.5 provides robustness checks to the estimated reduction in 
gastro-intestinal diseases, and the final section discusses cost and policy implications.  
                                                          
24 The World Health Organization, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, and Healthy People 2010. 
25 Evenhouse and Reilly (2005) find that cognitive ability improvement holds in within-family analysis, while other 
correlations disappear. Fletcher (2011) also sees the elimination of any positive effects when focusing on families 
who treat their children equally. In a longitudinal study Rothstein (2013) sees a positive effect of breastfeeding for 6 
months and longer on cognitive test scores, but it does not hold in within-sibling analysis. Finally, using Canadian 
data, Baker and Milligan (2008) do not find an improvement in infant health outcomes following a maternity leave 
mandate. 
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2.2. Background and Policy 
Between 1922 and 1991, Russia was part of the Soviet Union and under a socialist 
political rule. The communist country had strict law-enforceable work ethic standards and high 
gender parity in labor force.26 Russian men and women were equally expected to complete their 
education beyond high school and become productive members of society. Yet within the 
household, Soviet women were solely in charge of cooking, cleaning and raising children. 27 The 
resulting “double burden” for women did not provide enough incentive to have multiple children, 
and left the USSR struggling to increase fertility rates throughout its existence. For example, 
since 1940s, the government collected an annual tax on childlessness.28 Additionally, since 1947, 
families with more than three kids received some financial support; however, the proportion of 
those families in the population was small. 
At the same time, scarce availability of birth control and increasing prominence of pre-
marital relationships resulted in an increase in unplanned pregnancies, and forced many people 
into ‘shot-gun’ marriages at a very young age. It then became evident that earlier childbearing 
compromised advancement to higher education and the beginning of productive working life. 
Young adults struggled to raise their new families on low incomes and became dependent on 
immediate relatives and the state for financial support (Zakharov, 2008). In 1974, monthly 
                                                          
26 Unemployment (defined as not working for over 4 months in a year) was punishable by seizure of property and 2 
to 5 years of labor camp (Supreme Soviet of Russia; May 4, 1961).  
27 The concept of a new soviet woman – one who is a both productive member of society and a dutiful mother and 
wife – stems from Stalin ideology back in 1919.  
28 A 6% income tax affected unmarried men aged 25-50 and married women 20-45 years of age. Newlyweds were 
not taxed in the first year of marriage, which encouraged them to conceive right away.  
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support payments were introduced for extremely low-income families29, but this novelty merely 
helped families maintain a minimum standard of living. There was a need for new social policy 
that would be more allowing to the simultaneous work and the upbringing of children.  
At that time, working women were entitled to only 56 days of paid leave before and after 
birth, 112 days total. In 1970, the government added on to this policy by introducing a one-year 
job-protected leave after childbirth. The leave was unpaid, but it counted towards the overall 
employment history of a woman, which was crucial for future pensions and benefits. However, 
the opportunity costs of having a child, in terms of foregone wages, has remained high. 
 
2.2.1. 1980s Maternity Leave Expansion 
By the 1980s, women in Russia did not have paid maternity leave or any other monetary 
benefits beyond the 112 days around the time of the childbirth, and could not take maternity 
leave for more than 12 months after birth. New maternity leave policy was announced in the 
beginning of 1981 and had three components. First was a one-time payment equal to 50 rubles at 
the time of first childbirth and equal to 100 rubles for subsequent births. Second, a partially paid 
leave equal to about 30% of average salary was introduced until the child turned one.30 Finally, 
job protected leave was extended until the child turned 18 months of age.  
The new policy was enabled in two stages on the Russian territory. Phase I took effect on 
November 1, 1981 in low-population regions of Russia, which included 37 Siberia and the Far 
                                                          
29 Families with per-capita income of less than 50 rubles a month (less than 75 rubles/month for Siberia and Far East 
Regions) were issued a stipend of 12 rubles a month per child and until the child turned 8 years old (Goskomtrud 
and Secretariat VTsSPS, September 25, 1974.) 
30 Women in the Northern and Eastern regions of Russia received 50 rubles a month, and women in the rest of the 
country received 35 rubles a month. This was proportionate to the average salary differences between those regions. 
For comparison, 80% of the population earned no more than 150 rubles per month, and the largest income 
distribution class was 75-100 (23% of population) (Alexeev and Gaddy, 1993). 
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East regions.31 Phase II extended benefits to the rest of the republic32 a year later, on November 
1, 1982 (Figure 2-2). Soviet territories other than Russia saw maternity leave expansions even 
later.33 Women with total employment history of at least 1 year or those studying in polytechnic 
institutions or universities were eligible for benefits. Given the gender equality in education and 
the labor force that prevailed in the Soviet Union, majority of Russian women were covered 
under the new law. 
Malkova (2014) showed that this leave expansion had positive and lasting effects on 
fertility. She finds an increase in fertility of 8.2 percent in the year following the policy 
introduction. Extended maternity leave policies that were introduced in 1980s allowed women to 
comfortably have children earlier in their life and more easily combine family and work life. 
 
2.2.2. Maternity Leave Background 
Throughout last century, countries of various sizes and political ideologies have been 
expanding maternity leave access. The goals of such policies included increasing labor force 
participation, fertility and gender equality. Among 185 countries studied by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), only two countries do not offer paid leave and no country has cut 
maternity leave duration since 1994. By 2014, 53% of studied countries had at least 14 weeks of 
leave and only 15% provided less than 12 weeks. Shortest maternity leave with an average of 9.2 
weeks was offered in countries of the Middle East, while the longest average leave measured at 
27 weeks and was common in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
                                                          
31 Phase I included Northern regions of the country, Siberia, Far East, as well as Vologodskaya, Novgorodskaya and 
Pskovskaya regions. 
32 Phase II covered 51 of Central (European) regions of Russia (including Moscow and St. Petersburg) as well as 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Baltic states. 
33 Kazakhstan, Middle Asian and Caucasus regions received benefits starting November 1, 1983. 
 43 
 
Policy expansions have been used to estimate the effects of maternity leave in the past. 
There are two main directions in the maternity leave research. First includes papers that have 
evaluated short-term outcomes on infant health and mortality. Research in this area unilaterally 
suggests positive effects of maternity leave on birth outcomes and infant health. Parental leave in 
European countries was shown to reduce infant mortality by 2.5% given a 10-week extension 
(Ruhm 2000). In the United States, 12 weeks of unpaid leave were introduced with the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which was later linked to better birth and infant health outcomes 
for married and educated women (Rossin 2011). At the time of this research, there is no 
mandated paid maternity leave in the US. 
Second group of papers look at longer term outcomes such as education and wages. 
Dustman and Schoenberg (2012) look at three consecutive family leave expansions that have 
occurred in Germany between 1979 and 1992 and have increased paid time off from 2 months all 
the way to 18 months after birth. Using discontinuity design together with a difference-in-
difference approach, they do not find that expansions in leave have translated into better 
education, wages or probability of full-time employment for affected children. Yet, another study 
in Norway (Carneiro et al. 2015) suggests that children born to mothers who received an 
extension from unpaid 12 weeks to 4 months paid and an additional 8 months of unpaid leave 
starting July 1977 were better off. Those children had lower high school dropout rates and 
significantly higher wages at age 30. The effect was found to be greater for lower educated 
mothers, and those mothers who opted out for shorter leave prior to the reform. 
Using the same Russian maternity leave policy as in this paper, Malkova (2015) also 
looks at long-run educational and wage outcomes. She employs aggregate regional Census data 
and finds a small decrease in college degree completion, but otherwise sees no effect on the 
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socioeconomic status in the adulthood. In this paper I look at similar labor market outcomes and 
recreate these results with individual level data.  
 
 
 
2.2.3. Maternity Leave and Breastfeeding 
Breastfeeding is a natural way of mothers feeding their infant children with breast milk. 
Women Infant Children (WIC) and World Health Organizations (WHO) currently recommend 
exclusive breastfeeding for first six months of baby’s life. Recent health economics literature 
finds that maternity leave increases the prevalence of breastfeeding and prolongs breastfeeding 
duration. Looking at Canadian maternity leave increase in 2000, Baker and Milligan (2008) 
estimate that women eligible for the policy took 3-3.5 months more time off and subsequently 
increased their breastfeeding duration by an average of 1 month following the policy. 
Additionally, they saw a 40% increase in the proportion of mothers who breastfeed exclusively 
for the first 6 months of baby’s life.  
In a more recent study, Huang and Yang (2015) used California’s paid family leave 
program to study the impact of maternity leave on breastfeeding behavior. They found 3-5 
percentage point increases for excusive breastfeeding and 10-20 percentage point increases for 
breastfeeding during key development stages of the baby. 
Important to the study of this paper, breastfeeding was highly encouraged by Soviet 
government authorities due to its perceived health benefits for mothers and their babies. In 1980s 
Russia, newly extended maternity leave and breastfeeding behaviors of family members and 
friends resulted in almost universal breastfeeding among new mothers. We can confirm this by 
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looking at rare surveys conducted on Soviet women in the early 1990s. One study (Miner et al. 
1994) surveyed rural women in both the US and Russia to obtain breastfeeding rates at the time 
of hospital discharge. While for Wisconsin mothers breastfeeding initiation rates were about 
60%, all of the mothers in a small town northeast of Moscow were breastfeeding within days 
after birth. Another study (Knapp and Houghton 1999) reports the results of a WIC survey of 
immigrant mothers with first child born in USSR and last child born in the US. 43 out of 45 
(95%) of respondents believed breastfeeding was the most popular way of feeding infants in 
USSR, while only 10 (22%) said the same about the attitudes in the US. Interestingly, different 
social attitudes did not sway the women from their breastfeeding; 44 out of 45 mothers breastfed 
their American-born babies as well.   
Medical literature suggests that breastfeeding has positive health effects in the short-run. 
For example, one study shows that probiotics found in human milk are able to protect 
gastrointestinal and upper respiratory tracts of babies from infections (Martin 2004, Maldonado 
et al. 2012). Another meta-study suggests that breastfeeding may prevent the development of 
pediatric Irritable Bowel Disease (IBD) (Barclay 2009). It is possible that better health in the 
infancy may lead to fewer health problems twenty or thirty years later, when kids are grown up 
(as discussed in Jackson and Nazar 2006). Maternity leave policy expansion and access to self-
reported health data in this paper provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses whether 
certain chronic diseases in adulthood can be prevented or mitigated by better care during the first 
years of life. 
 
2.3. Data and Empirical Model 
2.3.1. Maternity Leave Participation Data 
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To study the effects of maternity leave on health outcomes by looking at the policy 
change, I need to make sure that the 1980s maternity leave program had high participation rates. 
I employ Survey of Stratification and Migration Dynamics (SSMD) data to help estimate the 
success of maternity leave policy in 1980s Soviet Union (Gerber, 2006). This dataset comes from 
a randomized survey conducted in 2001 on Russian adults 16 and over. The survey is comprised 
of retrospective questions about employment, family and migration of individuals between 1985 
and 2001. Each respondent lists up to 16 events in chronological order for each of the three 
aspects of their life. Therefore, for each individual in the dataset we are able to observe the 
timing of marriage and childbirth, as well as labor force participation behavior. Employment 
event categories include entry into the labor force, movement between jobs, unemployment 
periods and, most importantly, maternity leave start date and subsequent return to work.  
 While SSMD retrospective data starts at 1985, which is four years before the first wave 
of maternity leave expansion in 1981, it provides a good proxy for the eligibility and take-up of 
maternity leave immediately following the expansion. The only other expansion in Russia’s 
maternity leave policy was in 1989, less than two years before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, social policy and conditions in the beginning of 1980s were likely similar to 
those in the mid to late 1980s. 
To study the prevalence of maternity leave in 1980s Russia, I select a sample of women 
who report childbirth between 1985 and 1990. Since our research question in this paper relates 
primarily to working women and their children, I also limit the sample to births of mothers are 
currently in the labor force. For my analysis, I am able to obtain a sample of 566 births (Table 2-
1-1). 
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Because I observe employment history, I create a maternity leave eligibility variable 
equal to 1 if at the time of giving birth a woman has at least 1 year of total employment history. 
For 496 out of 566 births, or 87.9 percent, mothers were eligible for maternity leave at the time 
that they gave birth. Meanwhile only 78.8% of mothers reported taking a maternity leave from 
their job within a year of birth. This corresponds to about 90% participation rate among eligible 
mothers. Additionally, the data allows me to see exactly when the women started their maternity 
leave and when they returned to work. The average maternity leave duration in my sample is 608 
days, or about 20 months. This corresponds with the 18 month expected leave duration due to the 
most recent policy and the additional 2 months before the birth that were allowed by an earlier 
policy. 
 
2.3.2. Health Outcomes Data 
Detailed individual level data are obtained through Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS) of HSE, a project run by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Population 
Center and Demoscope team in Russia. Obtaining a representative sample in a post-socialist 
society poses unique difficulties. While pilot surveys of Phase I started in 1992, it wasn’t until 
Phase II of the project two years later that the survey design and management allowed for 
reliable data collection. Follow-up interviews of individual, household and community surveys 
continue to be conducted annually, which to date produced over 10 years of data for many 
individuals in the sample.  
Households are surveyed based on place of residence. Both children and adults report on 
their education and employment, health status and health care utilization, nutrition and 
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expenditures, among other things. Survey includes self-reported relationships within the family, 
so it is possible to link children to the information on their parents and siblings.  
Estimation sample for this paper was selected based on age and complete information on 
control variables. First, data are pooled across 17 rounds of annual interviews. I eliminate 
outliers by using families with up to 8 household members.34 To study the effects of the change 
in the maternity leave benefits on the outcomes of affected children in the adulthood, I look at 
individuals born between 1976 and 1987, that is within five years before the first wave of the 
policy extension in 1981 and five years after the second wave in 1982, and those who are 25 
years or older at the time of their interview. I also preserve RLMS-provided survey weights by 
using individuals with non-missing and non-zero individual weight. 
While it would be ideal to have information on the region of birth, RLMS only provides 
information on whether the current place of residence is the same as birthplace. Hence, I restrict 
the sample to those individuals with same birthplace and current residence and eliminate all 
those who are ever-movers. Labor mobility has always been fairly low in Russia, primarily due 
to household liquidity constraints (Andrienko and Guriev 2004), so for the purposes of this study 
it is convenient that 64% of surveyed individuals were born in the region of survey. 
The treatment variable in this research is identified using birth year and region of birth. 
Hence it is individual specific and does not vary in time. Inclusion of individual fixed effects, 
which is possible with longitudinal data and would allow us to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity, would actually eliminate the policy effect that we are trying to estimate. Hence, 
the longitudinal nature of this dataset cannot be employed in this paper. Data pooled from 2000-
2014 annual surveys contains many repeated interviews of responders, so I randomly select one 
                                                          
34 Thereby losing about 2% of the observations. 
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survey per each individual. In the end, there are 3590 unique individual-level observations 
(Table 2-1-2). 
To access the representativeness of my sample in a larger population of the studied 
country I compare it to the existing aggregated statistics. According to the 2010 Russian Census, 
urbanization rate was 73.7% (77% in my sample). Looking at 25 to 40 year olds (the age group 
closely corresponding to my sample aged 25-36), 55.4% of were registered as married, while 
only 13% were married in my sample. Of 25-40 year olds who reported their education, 21.8% 
had high school diploma only, 36% received polytechnic university education (PTU) and 34.1% 
had a university diploma. This suggests that my sample (29% high school, 23% PTU, 35% 
university) may be less educated than an average population sample. Because I use survey-
provided individual weights to account for the relative likelihood of observing each individual in 
the overall population, this should not pose a problem. Additionally, higher socio-economic 
status and marriage is often associated with better health, so the estimates of the policy effects 
based on our sample will be conservative. 
 
2.3.3. Mother’s Characteristics Sample 
 A small portion of the estimation sample of 938 individuals resided with their mothers at 
the time of the survey. For that group we are able to link information on mother’s characteristics 
to grown-up children’s responses. While maternity leave or breastfeeding information is not 
available, we observe mother’s age, education status and number of chronic diseases at the time 
of survey. These variables could be used in testing for selection into childbearing and potential 
bias in the regressions that do not include mother’s characteristics. I merge mother’s age, 
education and chronic disease information by using the reported intra-family relationships and 
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unique personal identification numbers. To capture overall health and genetic predispositions, I 
construct a single variable of total number of chronic diseases for the observed mothers. 
Last two columns of table 2-1-2 provide summary statistics on the children in the sample 
with mothers’ characteristics. This smaller sample is more rural; also only 6% of surveyed 
individuals are married, compared to the main sample average of 13%. Among the surveyed 
mothers 33% have high school education, 39% also received a technical institution diploma, and 
22% pursued a university degree. 
 
2.3.4. Empirical Specification 
The effects of the Russian maternity leave expansion are estimated using a difference-in-
differences approach. Conventionally, outcome variables are regressed on Post*Treat, Post and 
Treat indicator variables, control variables and fixed effects. Here, Post*Treat indicator is equal 
to 1 if an individual is born after the policy introduction in their region of birth, and equals 0 
otherwise.  
Because treatment occurs at a different time for both phases, it is not possible to include 
single Post and Treat indicators. Instead, Post variable in this specification is replaced by 
indicator variables for each birth year in the sample, and, similarly, Treat is represented by 
region of birth fixed effects. Separating time trends and regional differences allows for an 
identification of treatment effect and causal interpretation of coefficient 𝛽1 on Post*Treat in 
equation 1. 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑦 + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑡 + 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 ∗
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦 (1) 
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Elements of equation 1 vary by individuals (i), regions of birth /survey (r), survey (y) and birth 
years (t). There are three types of variables used in the regressions – household, individual and, 
for robustness check regressions, mother characteristics (Table 2-1-2). Household variables 
include household income and urban/rural status. At the individual level we control for sex, 
educational level indicator variables and income quartiles. All regressions are weighted by 
survey-provided individual weights to make the estimates representable to the overall population. 
For all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the regional level. 
Mother’s characteristics are not available for all observations in the sample. I am only 
able to link mothers and children if they reside in the same household at the time of survey. 
Since for my sample kids are already over 25, majority have moved out of their parents’ homes, 
and hence my sample size is reduced to 940 individuals. To preserve sample size, I only use 
mother’s characteristics in robustness check regressions to support my main analysis. 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦 is a regression-specific outcome variable for individual i born in year t in 
region r and surveyed in year y. Chronic outcomes include indicators for current heart, lung, 
liver, gastro-intestinal tract, kidney, spine and other chronic diseases. Other health outcomes 
include hospitalization (within last 3 months), health problems (within last month), health 
evaluation (on a scale from 1 to 5), and an indicator for self-reporting good or excellent health. 
We also are able to look at health behaviors such as medical check-ups, recent smoking and 
alcohol consumption. Finally, we look at educational attainment and wages to compare our 
results to those found in the previous literature.  
Table 2-2 compares raw means of outcomes between treated and not treated children. 
Comparison suggests that those born after the program was introduced in their region of birth are 
healthier, better educated and have higher wages. 61% children born after the policy reported 
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being in good or excellent health, while only 53% of those born before the policy said the same. 
Treated individuals also had 3.1 percentage points fewer recent health problems and lower 
likelihood of having liver, spinal and other chronic diseases. Raw differences in education and 
wages are smaller; treated group had 0.5 levels of education more than the untreated. 
 
2.4. Results  
Table 2-3 outlines main results for chronic disease outcomes. Panel A shows estimates on 
Post*Treat variable, which shows the average treatment effect across all phases and regions. 
Panel B breaks down the treatment effects by Phase I and Phase II, making it possible to see any 
heterogeneity between the different regions of the country.  
Maternity leave expansion has decreased the prevalence of chronic gastro-intestinal 
diseases by 9 percentage points for the treated children of Phase II regions, which corresponds to 
about 80% of the control group mean of 11%. We also see a 6.6 percentage point decrease in the 
prevalence of some other chronic diseases that don’t fit into general categories. Despite the 
intuitively correct negative signs of the estimates, no significant effect can be seen for heart, 
liver, kidney, spinal or lung chronic diseases. 
Regression estimates for other health outcomes and health behaviors are reported in 
Table 2-4. Children born after the maternity leave expansion do not report to be healthier, and 
are not less likely to smoke or drink alcohol. There is no effect on recent hospitalizations or 
medical check-ups either. 
Table 2-5 shows educational and wage estimates. The sign and magnitudes of the 
estimates are similar to those found in the previous literature (Dustman and Schoenberg, 2012). 
The coefficient on high school education is negative, while the coefficients on higher education 
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levels of polytechnic and university education are positive. While this suggests that there has 
been a shift away from high school only to complete technic and university education, the effects 
are not statistically significant. The magnitude of the education effects is between 7-12% of the 
control group mean. The coefficient on log wages is negligible and not statistically different 
from zero. These cognitive effects are in line with findings of earlier work that studied this 
policy expansion with aggregate Census data (Malkova 2015). 
 
 
2.5. Robustness Check and Alternative Specifications  
To estimate the effect of maternity leave on long-run health outcomes this paper uses a 
difference-in-differences regression approach on a quasi-experimental policy introduction. The 
main assumption of using this method is a similarity of the treated and the control groups. 
Significant differences across the independent variables for the cohorts born before and after the 
policy introduction would undermine the validity of the analysis. We test the balancing 
assumption by regressing control variables on Post*Treatiry, regional indicators and birth year 
dummies. Results outlined in Table 2-6 come from equation 2, and suggest that those born 5 
years after the maternity leave expansion are not statistically different from those born in the 5 
years before the policy. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑦 + 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑡 +
𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 ∗ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦 (2) 
 
The decrease in GI diseases observed in the main results should not be specific to the 
chosen sample, and should be persistent across the lifespan. To test that assumption, I estimate 
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equation 1 on a sample of individuals 30 and older. Column 1 of Table 2-7 confirms that the 
main effect persists and has an even larger magnitude of 9-12 percentage points. The larger 
magnitude of the estimate is intuitive, since chronic diseases tend to worsen later in life and are 
therefore more likely to be reported in a survey. 
To confirm that the reduction in GI chronic disease is relevant to the maternity leave 
policy, I run two falsification tests. In the first test, I include individuals who moved into their 
place of survey, making their birthplace unobservable. Therefore, treatment and control groups 
are defined by place of survey instead of place of birth, and are no longer applicable to the 
policy. Those individuals affected by the policy now mix in with those who may or may not have 
been affected. Naturally, the effect found earlier with a correct difference-in-difference 
specification now disappears (Column 2 of Table 2-7). In the second falsification test, I confirm 
that the identified treatment effects pertain to the 1981-82 maternity leave policy by using a false 
policy date. I use November of 1983 and 1984 as false treatment dates for Phase I and Phase II 
regions, respectively, while keeping the treatment and control regions unchanged. Column 3 of 
Table 2-7 shows that with this alternative specification there is no longer any significant 
treatment effect for GI chronic diseases.  
Previous literature that looked at this particular policy expansion found that it has 
increased fertility for lower educated and overall disadvantaged women (Malkova 2015), which 
is a concern for this analysis. While I do not see significant changes in mother’s age and 
education before and after treatment in my sample (Table 2-6), I would still like to test for the 
presence of this selection problem. I am able to control for mothers’ characteristics in a separate 
regression and see if the main treatment effect persists. As mentioned earlier, I am only able to 
observe maternal characteristics if grown-up children still reside with their parents, and this is 
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holds for 940 individuals in my sample. I re-estimate equation 1 with this smaller sample and 
add maternal education, birth year and number of chronic diseases to the equation. Due to the 
small sample size, year-region fixed effects are not included in this regression. 
 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑦 + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑦  (3) 
Table 2-8 shows that the significant negative effect persists after controlling for maternal 
characteristics. Magnitude of the coefficients obtained from equation 1 is larger for this sub-
sample, but it does not change when we control for maternal characteristics. The estimates 
confirm that even if there was selection into childbearing after the policy, this selection is not the 
driving factor for the decrease in GI chronic diseases. If anything, we would expect a positive 
effect or an absence of an effect, if disadvantaged mothers were also unhealthier and thus gave 
birth to unhealthier kids. 
Finally, I re-estimate equation 1 with less restrictive specifications of linear trends and 
fixed effects. Appendix Table 2-A1 shows that the reduction in chronic gastrointestinal diseases 
is robust to a variety of specifications. Additionally, Table 2-A2 uses the regression specification 
without the year-region fixed effects to confirm no significant effects of maternity leave on other 
chronic diseases, health and labor market outcomes.35 
 
2.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper studies long-run health impacts of the 1980s Russian maternity leave 
expansion. Children born in the five years following the policy had fewer gastro-intestinal 
                                                          
35 There is a negative effect for routine medical check-ups in the last 3 months; however, the effect is not robust 
across other trend and fixed effect specifications. 
 56 
 
diseases and fewer reports of other uncategorized chronic issues. The magnitude of the reduction 
in the prevalence in chronic GI diseases is 8-9 percentage points, which is large relative to the 
untreated group mean of 11 percent. The prevalence of uncategorized chronic issues was also 
decreased by 6.5 percentage points, or over 70% of the untreated cohort’s mean of 9.3. 
Despite large negative estimates on the prevalence of chronic diseases, paid maternity 
leave had no effect on the self-reported general health, recent health issues, hospitalizations or 
frequency of medical check-ups in adulthood. Health behaviors such as smoking and alcohol 
consumption also seem to be unaffected by the maternity leave. Small positive point estimates in 
the range of 2-4 percentage points were found for education attainment and wages, but they were 
not statistically significant.  
It is possible that chronic gastrointestinal illnesses of children affected by the maternity 
leave policy expansion were mitigated by breastfeeding, better nutrition and care in the first year 
of their life. In the previous studies, maternity leave has been shown to increase take-up and 
duration of breastfeeding (Huang and Yang 2015; Baker and Milligan 2008), and some evidence 
exists that health in the early childhood contributes to the chronic morbidity in adulthood and 
late in life (Blackwell et al 2001). An 80% reduction in gastrointestinal diseases found in this 
paper would significantly reduce hospitalization rates and health care costs. According to 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) report, in 2004 gastrointestinal diseases in the 
US accounted for 2.5 million hospitalizations, which in turn totaled 20.1 billion dollars.36 In my 
sample alone, those with gastrointestinal diseases were more likely to miss work due to illness 
and also more likely to be hospitalized.37  
                                                          
36 Hospital Stays for Gastrointestinal Diseases, 2004. Statistical Brief #12, September 2006 
37 40.9% of those with GI chronic diseases (n=376) were hospitalized in the last 3 months, compared to 32.7% of 
those with no reported GI issues (n=3,199). 6.1% of individuals with GI diseases (n=235) missed work due to illness 
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There is still a persistent gap in the literature for long-run health outcomes of maternity 
leave; it stems primarily from lack of longitudinal and multigenerational data with early 
childcare variables. If in the future we conduct more breastfeeding studies and ask detailed 
surveys on maternal investments during early childcare, we would be able to conduct better 
econometric analysis and make more accurate policy suggestions. Evidence on the benefits on 
maternity leave and breastfeeding is crucial to effectively advocate for mandated paid leave in 
the US and push for a legislation that would bring this country’s maternal support at par with the 
rest of industrialized world. 
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Figure 2-1: Maternity Leave and Its Mechanism of Work 
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Figure 2-2: Maternity Leave Program Phases and Regions 
 
 
 
Note: Light grey area represents less populated areas of the country and corresponds with Phase I of the 
program in November 1981. Darker Grey areas include Moscow, Saint Petersburg and the most populated 
regions, and represent Phase II of the program launched in November1982. 
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Table 2-1-1: SSMD Data Summary Statistics 
          
Variable Mean Min Max Obs 
          
Age at Childbirth 26.12 16.88 40.13 566 
Urban 0.78 0 1 566 
High school Diploma Only 0.21 0 1 566 
Polytechnic Education 0.5 0 1 566 
University Education 0.27 0 1 566 
          
Maternity Leave Eligibility  0.873 0 1 566 
Maternity Leave Take-Up 0.788 0 1 566 
Maternity Leave Duration (years) 1.66 0 11.25 496 
Notes: Data summary at birth level from SSMD sample of working women with births between 
1985 and 1990. Maternity leave eligibility was satisfied with total work experience of at least 1 
year, maternity leave take-up was self-reported, and maternity leave duration was constructed 
based on the reported timing of a return to work post maternity leave, transfer within the 
company or start of a new job. 
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Table 2-1-2: RLMS Data Summary Statistics           
    
Main Sample 
  Mother's 
Characteristics 
Sample 
Type Variable Obs Mean   Obs Mean 
Household Regional Identifier 3,590 93.09   940 93.53 
Controls Survey Year 3,590 2011   940 2010.63 
  Individual Survey Weight 3,590 1.09   940 1.10 
  Urban 3,590 0.77   940 0.75 
  Suburban but not rural 3,590 0.04   940 0.04 
  HH Income in Q2 (25-50% range) 3,590 0.23   940 0.21 
  HH Income in Q3 (50-75% range) 3,590 0.25   940 0.28 
  HH Income in Q4 (75-100% range) 3,590 0.32   940 0.34 
              
Individual Birth Year 3,590 1981.17   940 1981.88 
Controls Female 3,590 0.51   940 0.50 
  Married 3,590 0.13   940 0.06 
  Education Level 3,559 17.33   932 17.32 
  High school Education 3,559 0.29   932 0.30 
  PTU (Tech) Education 3,559 0.23   932 0.21 
  University Education 3,559 0.35   932 0.37 
              
Outcomes Chronic GI Disease 3,576 0.11   936 0.10 
  Chronic Heart Disease 3,584 0.03   937 0.04 
  Chronic Liver Disease 3,583 0.03   938 0.04 
  Chronic Lung Disease 3,583 0.03   938 0.03 
  Chronic Kidney Disease 3,582 0.05   938 0.05 
  Chronic Spine Disease 3,578 0.07   937 0.07 
  Other Chronic Disease 3,540 0.07   922 0.07 
  Smoker 3,582 0.43   938 0.42 
  Alcohol Consumption (Last 30 days) 2,865 0.72   722 0.71 
  Health Problems (Last 30 days) 3,580 0.22   936 0.25 
  Hospitalizations (Last 3 months) 3,589 0.04   939 0.04 
  Health Evaluation (1=excel, 5=poor) 3,577 2.43   936 2.42 
  Excellent or Good Health 3,590 0.56   940 0.59 
  Medical Checkup (Last 3 months) 3,587 0.18   940 0.20 
              
Mother Birth Year - -   940 1955.24 
Controls High school Education - -   938 0.33 
  PTU (Tech) Education - -   938 0.39 
  University Education - -   938 0.22 
  Number of Chronic Diseases - -   933 1.06 
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Table 2-2: Mean Comparison for Outcomes 
  Post*Treat 
Mean 
Difference T-stat 
  0 1 (1-0)   
Self-Report as Healthy 0.534 0.612 0.0827**** 4.91 
Health Evaluation (1=excellent) 2.474 2.361 -0.116**** -5.53 
Health Problems Last 30 Days 0.236 0.205 -0.0302** -2.13 
Hospitalized Last 3 Months 0.042 0.039 -0.0042 -0.62 
Medical Checkup Last 3 Months 0.184 0.174 -0.0116 -0.89 
Chronic Gastrointestinal Disease 0.110 0.096 -0.0145 -1.39 
Chronic Heart Disease 0.038 0.028 -0.00949 -1.54 
Chronic Liver Disease 0.045 0.018 -0.0250*** -4.13 
Chronic Lung Disease 0.035 0.025 -0.0116* -1.94 
Chronic Kidney Disease 0.050 0.040 -0.0124* -1.72 
Chronic Spinal Disease 0.074 0.053 -0.0260*** -3.03 
Other Chronic Disease 0.093 0.041 -0.0432**** -5.07 
Smoker 0.441 0.421 -0.0206 -1.22 
Drank Alcohol Last 30 Days 0.720 0.701 -0.0333* -1.93 
Education Level 17.141 17.607 0.472**** 3.56 
High School education 0.313 0.262 -0.0542**** -3.49 
PTU (Tech) education 0.216 0.251 0.0340** 2.37 
University Education 0.336 0.375 0.0393** 2.41 
Log wages 9.162 9.492 0.248**** 6.18 
          
N     3590   
Note: * Difference is statistically significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** 
significant at 1% level, **** significant at 0.1%. 
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Table 2-7: Chronic GI Diseases - Specification Check   
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
30 years               
and older       
sample 
Sample not 
restricted to       
non-movers 
Use            
1983 / 1984               
as treatment 
Panel A:       
All Treated -0.0917* -0.0442 -0.0220 
  (0.0474) (0.0295) (0.0375) 
Panel B:       
Phase 1 Treated -0.0398 -0.0202 0.0152 
  (0.0506) (0.0341) (0.0528) 
Phase 2 Treated -0.122** -0.0580* -0.0551 
  (0.0547) (0.0325) (0.0434) 
Observations 1,896 5,307 3,545 
R-squared 0.273 0.167 0.224 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each column and panel is a separate regression with 
individual controls, birth year, survey year and regional dummies, as well as 
region and survey-year interaction variables. 
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Table 2-8: The Effect of Maternity Leave on GI Diseases:                                          
Mother Characteristics Sample 
  (1) (2) 
  Individual Characteristics Mother Characteristics 
Panel A:     
All Treated -0.121* -0.133* 
  (0.0713) (0.0747) 
Panel B:     
Phase 1 Treated -0.104 -0.104 
  (0.0779) (0.0773) 
Phase 2 Treated -0.128 -0.145* 
  (0.0797) (0.0844) 
Observations 928 919 
R-squared 0.170 0.199 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each column and panel is a separate regression with 
indicated controls, birth year, survey year and regional dummies. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table 2-A1: Alternative Fixed Effect and Trend Specifications for GI Diseases 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
No Time 
Trend or 
Fixed Effect 
Survey Year 
Fixed Effect 
Survey 
Year Trend 
Survey 
Year*Region 
Regional 
Linear 
Trend 
Panel A:           
All Treated -0.0523* -0.0549* -0.0520* -0.0803** -0.0614** 
  (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0380) (0.0309) 
Panel B:           
Phase 1 Treated -0.0411 -0.0435 -0.0417 -0.0622 -0.0462 
  (0.0386) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0504) (0.0412) 
Phase 2 Treated -0.0581* -0.0608* -0.0574* -0.0898** -0.0700** 
  (0.0328) (0.0330) (0.0327) (0.0439) (0.0347) 
            
Survey Year FE no yes no no yes 
Survey Year Trend no no yes no no 
            
Observations 3,545 3,545 3,545 3,545 3,545 
R-squared 0.050 0.054 0.051 0.225 0.093 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). Each column and panel is a separate regression with individual controls, birth year and 
regional dummies. 
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Table 2-A2: Robustness Check: Less Restrictive Regression Equations     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Chronic 
Diseases GI Heart Liver Lungs Kidney Spinal Other 
Panel 1A:               
All Treated -0.0549* 0.00797 0.0222 0.0338 0.0266 0.0177 -0.0299 
  (0.0295) (0.0229) (0.0169) (0.0238) (0.0258) (0.0269) (0.0276) 
Panel 1B:               
Phase 1 
Treated -0.0435 0.0177 0.0222 0.0246 0.0159 0.0081 -0.0137 
  (0.0379) (0.0306) (0.0261) (0.0213) (0.0275) (0.0311) (0.0369) 
Phase 2 
Treated -0.0608* 0.00303 0.0222 0.0384 0.0320 0.0226 -0.0383 
  (0.0330) (0.0231) (0.0137) (0.0261) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0277) 
Observations 3,545 3,553 3,552 3,552 3,551 3,547 3,509 
R-squared 0.054 0.051 0.050 0.042 0.057 0.072 0.108 
                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2. Health 
and Health 
Behavior 
Outcomes Smoking 
Recent 
Alcohol 
Consumption 
Recent 
Health 
Problems 
Hospitalized 
Last 3 
Months 
Health 
Evaluation 
Excellent 
/ Good 
Health 
Annual             
Check-
ups 
Panel 2A:               
All Treated 0.00844 0.0337 0.0235 -0.0113 0.0253 -0.0045 -0.0515 
  (0.0579) (0.0547) (0.0696) (0.0222) (0.0735) (0.0578) (0.0547) 
Panel 2B:               
Phase 1 
Treated 0.0242 0.0989 0.0542 -0.0004 0.001 0.0138 -0.0996* 
  (0.0627) (0.0631) (0.0851) (0.0234) (0.0841) (0.0696) (0.0590) 
Phase 2 
Treated 
0.000398 -0.00228 0.00793 -0.0168 0.0375 -0.0138 -0.0271 
  (0.0626) (0.0556) (0.0632) (0.0230) (0.0772) (0.0589) (0.0546) 
Observations 3,552 2,843 3,549 3,558 3,546 3,559 3,556 
R-squared 0.282 0.136 0.077 0.054 0.127 0.119 0.079 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Each column and panel is a separate regression with individual controls, birth year and regional dummies. 
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Table 2-A2 (Continued): Robustness Check: Less Restrictive Regression Equations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
3. Education and 
Wage Outcomes 
High School     
Education 
Poly-Technic 
Education  
University       
Education 
Education             
Level 
Log                      
Wages 
Panel 3A:           
All Treated -0.0682 0.0229 0.0413 0.228 -0.0867 
  (0.0708) (0.0494) (0.0642) (0.511) (0.0979) 
Panel 3B:           
Phase 1 Treated -0.102 0.0749 0.0131 0.168 0.0118 
  (0.0762) (0.0532) (0.0588) (0.525) (0.132) 
Phase 2 Treated -0.0512 -0.00363 0.0557 0.259 -0.141 
  (0.0725) (0.0513) (0.0696) (0.537) (0.0895) 
Observations 3,559 3,559 3,559 3,559 3,027 
R-squared 0.107 0.071 0.110 0.147 0.424 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each 
column and panel is a separate regression with individual controls, birth year, survey year 
and regional dummies. 
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CHAPTER 3:                                                                                                                                 
Two-Stage Estimates of the Effect of Maternal Labor Supply                                                            
on Child Achievement 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Female labor supply has been growing steadily between 1950 and 2000, and has 
remained above 56% ever since.38 Labor force participation (LFP) of mothers has been 
increasing as well; for example, the proportion of those who work among women with pre-
school children has increased from 40% in 1975 to over 63% in 2000 (Figure 3-1). More women 
choose to pursue a career while simultaneously raising their children.39 Female labor supply is 
also becoming increasingly independent from the wages of their partners (Blau and Kahn, 2007). 
This egalitarian social dynamic could decrease the amount of time children spend with their 
mothers in their infancy and early childhood, and may affect the children’s wellbeing later in 
life. A major obstacle to studying the effects of increased maternal work on child’s outcomes is 
the endogeneity of mothers’ decision to participate in the labor market. By looking at the 
immigrant population, this paper explores gender inequality in the source country as a new 
instrumental variable for the labor supply of married women. 
Mother’s decision to work is an endogenous variable in the framework of an economic 
model for two reasons. First, it is difficult to collect data on all the variables that could shape 
one’s decision to work, especially if the woman’s family is financially stable and second income 
is not necessary. In developed countries like the US, women are free to allocate their time 
between paid work, unpaid housework and childcare according to their own preference, and their 
                                                          
38 Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Women, 1950-2000 
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300002). 
39 “72% of adults under 30 view the ideal marriage as one in which husband and wife both work and share child care 
and household duties” The New York Times Article by Natalie Angier, “The Changing American Family” 
(11/25/2013). 
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decision often depends on uniquely personal reasons. Second, estimating the effect of maternal 
work on the outcomes of children is especially challenging due to the reverse causality problem. 
A woman may choose to withdraw from the labor force if her children fall below average in their 
development. At the same time, a below average development of a child could be a result of lack 
of parental investments due to maternal work. 
In this paper, I employ country-specific gender inequality measure as an instrument for 
the endogenous female immigrant’s labor force participation. After controlling for individual 
characteristics and immigrant visa types, I find that gender inequality in the source country is 
positively correlated with women’s labor force participation in the US. Using data from the New 
Immigrant Survey then allows me to estimate the causal effect of female labor force participation 
on the reading and math scores of their children. Two stage least squares estimates suggest that 
children aged 3 to 12 whose mothers work for pay score over one standard deviation higher than 
their counterparts on achievement scores. This result holds for both verbal and quantitative tests. 
 
3.2.  Literature and Identification Strategy  
 
3.2.1. Literature Overview 
Current literature is interested in both the determinants and the effects of the female labor 
force participation. One variable that could directly influence a woman’s decision to work is the 
size of her family. However, using infertility to instrument for the number of children in the 
family, Agüero et al. (2008) does not find this to be the case today. Availability of affordable 
childcare is another important factor for women that are deciding to come back to work after 
giving birth (Cortés and Tessada, 2011). A woman’s willingness to work may also depend on her 
ethnic background, cultural norms and the environment of her upbringing. Blau and Kahn (2011) 
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explore the importance of societal norms by studying immigrants in the US. They use source 
country characteristics and pre-immigration work history at the time of immigration to separate 
the effects of culture and human capital on the immigrant’s US work hours. Women from 
countries with higher female labor force participation contribute more annual work hours in the 
US.  
Literature on the effects of maternal labor force participation on children’s well being 
suggests that the effect is heterogeneous depending on the age of the child, child’s 
socioeconomic status and the type of outcome studied. Maternal work during child’s infancy 
seems to have lasting effects. Baum (2003) finds negative effects of maternal work during 
child’s infancy on their cognitive test scores later in life, especially if mothers return to work 
within the first 3 months after birth. Using OLS and propensity scores models, Berger et al. 
(2005) also study mothers who return to work within 12 weeks after birth, and find statistically 
significant reductions in breastfeeding and immunizations, as well as an increase in behavioral 
problems of the children as a result. Gregg et al. (2005) finds that mother’s full-time employment 
and an informal substitute of care in the first year and a half after birth negatively affects 
cognitive outcomes of children when they are older, at 4 to7 years of age.  
James-Burdumy (2005) uses individual fixed effects models on panel data and finds that 
children’s math scores were lower due to maternal work during the first year of child’s life. 
Meanwhile, children whose mothers worked during the third year of their life had higher math 
scores later on. Looking at the outcomes of adolescents, Ruhm (2008) finds that maternal work 
has a positive effect on cognitive development of children from lower socioeconomic classes or 
disadvantaged otherwise. He also reports a negative effect of maternal work on the development 
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of children who are relatively better off, which could be due to the reduction of maternal 
investments in the environment at home. 
 
3.2.2. Source Country Gender Inequality as an Instrumental Variable 
I use an instrumental variables approach to identify the causal effect of maternal work on 
children’s achievement in reading and math. The new excluded instrument proposed here is the 
Gender Inequality Index, which is reported by the United Nations Development Programme40 
(Figure 3-2). The index combines information on relative LFP rates, parliamentary seats, birth 
mortality rates and other information to construct a measure of gender inequality within a 
particular country.  
Column 2 of Table 3-1 shows GII index values for the countries and regions of world that 
supply most of the US immigrants. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means no gender 
inequality in the society. For example, South Korea with the GII of 0.125 is the most gender-
equal country on this list, while Haiti with GII of 0.603 has the most gender inequality.41 United 
States has a GII of 0.28, and, therefore, over 75% of source countries on the list have higher GII 
numbers and hence higher gender inequality.  
Gender inequality in an immigrant’s source country works as an instrumental variable 
because it does not directly affect children living in the US, but it is likely to influence woman’s 
decision-making on the specialization within her household. Previous research on culture and 
female immigrant labor supply predicts that women from more gender-equal societies tend to 
work more in the US, which confirms the relevance of source culture on the job market behavior 
                                                          
40 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-
inequality-index-gii). Index is time invariant and is calculated for the year 2015. 
41 For the overall list of countries on the UNDP website, country with the least gender inequality is Switzerland 
(GII=0.04), and country with the greatest gender inequality is Yemen (GII=0.767).  
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in the US (Blau and Kahn 2011; Blau and Kahn, 2015). The GII would also be excluded from the 
regression of children’s test scores on their mother’s labor supply, because they would only be 
impacted by the source country GII indirectly through their mother’s time investment decisions. 
Because GII is a more comprehensive measure of inequality than the relative LFP rates, 
the direction of the relationship between a woman’s source country GII and her attitudes toward 
market work is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, women’s beliefs about time investments 
in family and paid work may align with the societal norms that women are born into, causing her 
to continue her employment pattern post-migration. On the other hand, immigrants represent a 
group that has self-selected to leave their country of birth to live and work in the United States. 
One of the reasons to immigrate could be the woman’s unwillingness to comply with her cultural 
norms. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether there is a positive or a negative relationship 
between her US labor force participation and source country GII.  
 
3.3. Data and Empirical Model 
3.3.1. Data Sources 
Data for this paper comes from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS)42, a nationally 
representative panel of new immigrants in the US. The US Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) provided the administrative data on new green card holders for the year 2003, who 
were then reached out to and asked to participate in the survey. In Round 1, the project looked at 
8573 adult immigrants (69% response rate), their spouses and children, as well as 810 child 
immigrants (64.8% response rate) between 2003 and 2004. Round 2, a follow-up survey, was 
                                                          
42 Jasso, Guillermina, Douglas S. Massey, Mark R. Rosenzweig and James P. Smith. “The New Immigrant Survey 
2003 Round 1 (NIS-2003-1) Public Release Data.” March 2006. Retrieved {June 2016}. Funded by NIH HD33843, 
NSF, USCIS, ASPE & Pew. http://nis.princeton.edu. 
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conducted in 2007 to 2009. The NIS collected detailed individual and household variables, 
including pre-migration experiences and language proficiency, education, employment history, 
income, health insurance and health utilization. For surveyed child immigrants and immigrant 
children the project conducted a separate child interview and tests of memory and learning 
achievement (Digit Span and Woodcock Johnson Assessment). 
To study the effects of maternal work on the outcomes of children, I select two samples 
from Round 1 of the NIS. First sample is of married and cohabitating female adult immigrants 
that are no more that 65 years old. I only include immigrants who are currently in the US and not 
interviewed while overseas. The second sample is that of children who took the Woodcock 
Johnston tests of achievement and who were also present in the households of surveyed 
immigrant women. Children in this sample could be either biological, adopted, stepchildren or 
co-residents of the female immigrants. I link the adult and the child samples by using the survey-
provided personal and household identification numbers. In the end, my sample consists of 527 
married women and their 777 dependents. 
Summary statistics for immigrant mothers, their spouses and children are outlined in 
Table 3-2. Forty one percent of all mothers in the sample are employed and work for pay. As an 
additional measure of labor supply, I use annual work weeks and weekly work hours to construct 
an annual US work hours variable, which has an average of 674. Average age for mothers in the 
sample is 35.8 years old. Looking at the source region of married female immigrants, 49% are 
from European countries (including Eastern Europe) and 27% come from Asian countries. 
Women in this sample obtained their US permanent residency primarily through marriage to a 
US citizen (21% of sample), employment sponsorship (17%) or diversity visas (16%). 
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Main differences between working and non-working married women are in the 
immigration reasons and time since migration. Mothers who are in the labor force have been in 
the US longer, and were more likely to obtain permanent residency through their employer. No 
significant differences in women’s age, schooling or region of origin are observed between the 
working and non-working groups. 
 Table 3-2 also lists children’s outcomes of interest, the scores for Woodcock-Johnson III 
tests of achievement. Scores for tests 1 and 9 reflect child’s letter-word identification and 
passage comprehension ability, while tests 5 and 10 relate to mathematical calculations and 
quantitative reasoning skills.  
 
3.3.2. Estimating the Effect of Gender Inequality Index on Mother’s LFP 
The empirical approach to obtain unbiased estimates of mother’s LFP on children’s 
outcomes would be to use Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS). First stage of the Two Stage Least 
Squares model is a regression of the endogenous variable LFP on the excluded and included 
instruments. The regression model largely follows the approach of modeling US work hours of 
female immigrants by Blau and Kahn (2011).  
𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑠 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼 ∗ 𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋𝑠𝑝𝑖 + 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑠   (1) 
Labor supply LS is regressed on a variable capturing pre-immigration cultural experience, 
individual and spouse controls, immigration visa type, as well as world region and US state fixed 
effects. I test three pre-immigration variables indicative of immigrant’s culture and pre-
disposition to work in the US: source country GII, a ratio of spouse source country GII to own 
GII, and work hours prior to immigration to the US. Individual variables include female 
immigrant’s age and squared age, total years of schooling, years and squared years since 
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migration. Spouse variables include age, age squared and total years of schooling. Regional fixed 
effects are dummy variables for immigrants’ source regions of the world, and include Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and Middle East. State fixed effects include indicators for states of residence 
and capture state labor market heterogeneity. 
 
3.3.3. Estimating the Effect of Mother’s LFP on Child Outcomes 
Second stage of the 2SLS estimation is regressing outcomes of interest on the predicted 
value of the endogenous variable obtained in the first stage and all the exogenous controls 
included in the first stage. Equation 2 outlines the second stage of 2SLS model. 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 =  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖  + 𝛽1 ∗ Pr(LSi) + 𝑋𝑖  +  𝑋𝑠𝑝𝑤  +  𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟  +  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑠      (2) 
Woodcock-Johnson III assessments conducted for the NIS include achievement tests 1, 5, 9 and 
10. Tests 1 and 9 are on letter-word identification and passage comprehension, respectively, and 
tests 5 and 10 are on math calculations and applied math problems. Coefficient β1 in equation 2 
is the 2SLS estimate of the causal effect of maternal work on child’s test score. In addition to the 
variables in the first stage model, the second stage regression includes child age and age squared, 
since raw achievement tests results should be compared to the peer age group. 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. First Stage 
The determinants of labor supply of married immigrant mothers as estimated by equation 
1 are presented in Table 3-3. Work for pay is the dependent labor supply variable in columns 1 
and 2, and annual work hours are used for columns 3 and 4.43 Three excluded instruments tested 
                                                          
43 Regressions of annual work hours include mothers who do not work for pay and have zero work hours.  
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here are the immigrant’s source country work hours (pre-immigration human capital) and source 
country gender inequality index (culture). 
It is estimated that an immigrant woman with an additional 1000 annual work hours in 
her home country has 3.2 percentage points higher probability of working in the US. The 
estimate is significant at 10%. Another positive relationship is revealed between the choice to 
work and the source country patriarchy, as measured by the Gender Inequality Index. A one 
standard deviation increase in country GII (which is an increase in country’s inequality) 
increases the likelihood of female work in the US by 7.8 percentage points. If we instead look at 
the US work hours, the direction and significance of the first stage does not change. An 
additional 1000 annual work hours prior to immigration increases the US annual work hours by 
78.7, and a one standard deviation increase in the home country GII increases US annual work 
hours by 113.08.  
Among other variables that affect mother’s labor supply are years since migration, length 
of their current marriage, and immigration path. The estimates in table 3-3 suggest that GII is the 
only relevant instrumental variable for both immigrant women’s LFP and their annual work 
hours in the US. To test the excludability assumption of this IV, I check if GII is correlated with 
any of the control variables. To do so, I perform a balancing test of the covariates by regressing 
my controls on the inequality index. Table 3-4 shows that none of the coefficients on the GII are 
significant at the 5% level. In the next section, I use GII as an excluded instrument for all the 
two-stage least squares regression specifications.  
 
3.4.2. Two-Stage Least Squares: Work for Pay 
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Columns 1-4 of Table 3-5 show coefficients from regressions of achievement test scores 
on the maternal labor supply indicator. Each consecutive column adds more independent 
variables and fixed effects. For example, Column 1 estimate comes from a simple linear 
regression, while Column 4 regression includes maternal and paternal characteristics, 
immigration region and state fixed effects. After controlling for parental characteristics, OLS 
regressions show small and mostly non-significant coefficients from regressions of child WJIII 
scores on mother’s labor supply. Estimates suggest that maternal work increases verbal and 
quantitative skills of children by no more than 0.3 to 2.2 points. The only significant effect in the 
least squares estimation is a 1.9-point increase in the scores for quantitative reasoning, which is a 
0.14 standard deviation increase relative to the mean score of 22.51. 
Estimation results for Two Stage Least Squares are outlined in columns 5-8 of Table 3-5. 
The estimates are larger compared to those obtained with least squares, and many are now 
statistically significant. Children with working mothers score an estimated 61.6 points higher on 
four of the major WJIII achievement tests combined. Most prominent effect of maternal work is 
on child’s reading skills. Estimates suggest that children with working mothers score on average 
35.5 points higher on letter-word identification, which is an effect equal to 1.55 standard 
deviations from the mean. Children of this group also score 12 points (0.96 standard deviations) 
higher on the passage comprehension test. Scores for quantitative reasoning test are also 15.2 
points (1.16 standard deviations) higher for children of working moms; however, no effect was 
found on computational math skills. 
 
3.4.3. Two Stage Least Squares: Work Hours 
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Table 3-6 summarizes point estimates from least squares and IV regressions of children’s 
achievement scores on annual work hours of mothers. OLS model estimates that an additional 
1000 work hours a year (about 19 hours/week) would increase quantitative reasoning scores by 
1.1 points. Estimates for other types of tests are also small and not significant at 5% level.  
In contrast, IV estimates show large effects for both math and verbal achievement tests.  
An additional 1000 maternal work hours a year increases the letter-word identification scores by 
24.3 points, or 1.06 standard deviations. Same amount of maternal work increases child’s 
quantitative reasoning scores by 10.4 points, or by 0.8 standard deviations.  
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 First stage estimation results confirm findings of the previous literature that suggest 
source country culture is an important determinant of the immigrant woman’s choice to work. 
However, lower inequality in the home country no longer predicts higher activity in the US job 
market. The fact that women who come from higher inequality countries are more likely to be 
working in the US could be an indicator of their self-selection into immigration. Women who do 
not conform to the culture of their own country could be moving to US because it provides more 
social acceptance and opportunity for working women.  
 Using GII as an exogenous instrumental variable also allowed me to evaluate the effect of 
the immigrant women’s increased labor market supply on the outcomes of their co-resident 
children. Children of married immigrant women who work have on average higher reading and 
math standardized test scores than children of stay-at-home mothers. The findings are in line 
with the literature studying the development of children in the age group of 3-12 (James-
Burdumy 2005; Ruhm 2008). Several potential mechanisms could result in a positive effect of 
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maternal work on children. First, while they may spend less time with their children (Cawley and 
Liu, 2012), the time that working moms allocate towards children could be more productive than 
the time allocated by other mothers.44 To test if maternal labor supply impacts certain parental 
behaviors, I use 319 child interview responses available for my sample. Children were asked if 
their parents participate in various school activities or help them with decisions regarding their 
curriculum.  
𝑃𝐼𝑖 =  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∗ Pr_LFw + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋_𝑠𝑝𝑖 +  𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠      (3) 
Table 3-7 outlines 2SLS estimates from regressions of various parental involvement variables on 
maternal labor supply. Each parental investment measure is an indicator variable, which is set to 
1 if the child indicates it occurs frequently. The results suggest that working mothers are more 
likely to visit their children’s classes and go to school meetings. It seems that knowing what their 
children learn in school may be increasing the effectiveness of parental help with school 
assignments and tutoring. 
 Second, working mothers could be better role models for their children. Given that 
immigrant children are somewhat disadvantaged relative to native children, previous literature 
suggests that maternal work would improve upon their cognitive development (Ruhm 2008). 
Similar effect is observed here for achievement scores. Children may be more motivated in 
school if they see both their parents pursuing their careers as a societal norm. Finally, greater 
assimilation of parents may be beneficial for the children in other unobservable ways. For 
example, substitute types of childcare and tutoring are some of the factors that are not observed 
in the context of this study. 
                                                          
44 Cawley and Liu (2012) use ATUS to find that working mothers spend less time on cooking and spending time 
with children; only 15% of that time is offset by their spouses and partners. 
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Findings in this paper shed light on the relationship between maternal labor supply and 
child achievement. Contrary to the common belief that mother’s work and longer work hours 
would reduce the time spent with children and hence be detrimental to their development, 
children of working mothers perform better in both math and reading tests. Because estimation 
results are based on a limited sample of immigrant families, more research is needed to evaluate 
the true effects of maternal work. An extension of this study would be using the IV approach on 
a larger sample of both natives and immigrants. Particularly, studies based on native samples 
could use Gender Inequality Index as a proxy for ethnic culture and social attitudes. 
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Figure 3-1: Labor Force Participation of Women by Age of their Children, 1975-2008 
 
Notes: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, The Economics Daily, Labor force 
participation of women and mothers, 2008 on the Internet at 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2009/ted_20091009.htm 
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Figure 3-2: Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
 
Notes: Gender Inequality Index ranges from 0 to 1, with larger numbers indicating greater societal 
inequality between men and women. GII index is developed and reported by the United Nations 
Development Programme (Map Source: Gender Inequality Index (GII) Worldwide Distribution, 
ChartsBin.com, http://chartsbin.com/view/23499). 
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Table 3-1: Gender Inequality Index for NIS Countries and Regions 
Country GII 
Number of Immigrants in 
the Sample 
Canada 0.129 10 
China 0.191 18 
Columbia 0.429 11 
Cuba 0.356 12 
Dominican Republic 0.477 8 
El Salvador 0.427 76 
Ethiopia 0.558 3 
Guatemala 0.533 26 
Haiti 0.603 4 
India 0.563 56 
Jamaica 0.43 5 
Korea 0.125 18 
Mexico 0.373 180 
Nigeria 0.575 9 
Peru 0.406 10 
Philippines 0.42 42 
Poland 0.138 22 
Russia 0.276 4 
Ukraine 0.286 18 
United Kingdom 0.177 1 
United States 0.28 0 
Vietnam 0.308 24 
Europe 0.3 82 
Asia 0.328 53 
Latin America 0.415 45 
Africa 0.575 18 
Middle East 0.388 19 
Oceania 0.403 3 
N   777 
Notes: Data for GII taken from United Nations Development Programme 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii).  
Data on immigrants is from NIS sample for this paper. 
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Table 3-2: Summary Statistics for Mother Controls and Child Outcome Variables 
Category Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mother's  Work for pay  0.408  0.49 0   1 
Labor Supply  Annual US Work Hours  674.66  926.4 0  3380  
  Annual Pre-US Work Hours 1045.89 1131.73 0 5096 
Mother  GII index 0.38 0.11 0.13 0.60 
Controls Age 35.75 5.86 19 60 
  Years of Schooling 12.15 4.21 2 24 
  Years Since Migration (YSM) 7.85 7.34 0 41 
Mother  Asia 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Country of  Africa 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Origin Middle East 0.18 0.38 0 1 
  Latin America 0.02 0.15 0 1 
  Europe 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Mother  Spouse of US Citizen 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Immigration Spouse of US LPR 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Category Parent of US Citizen 0.01 0.10 0 1 
  Family Fourth Preference 0.07 0.26 0 1 
  Employment 0.17 0.38 0 1 
  Diversity 0.16 0.37 0 1 
  Refuge 0.06 0.24 0 1 
  Legalization 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Father  Age 38.76 6.70 23 67 
Controls Years of Schooling 12.10 4.70 1 28 
  Years Married 11.73 6.12 0 36 
Children's  Age 7.38 2.91 3 12 
Outcomes WJ Sum of Test Scores 81.61 54.37 0 217 
  WJ Test 1 – Letter Word Identification 33.79 22.84 0 76 
  WJ Test 5 – Computational Skills 11.20 9.67 0 43 
  WJ Test 9 - Passage Comprehension 14.11 12.48 0 47 
  WJ Test 10 – Quantitative Reasoning 22.51 13.08 0 59 
N   777       
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Table 3-3: Determinants of Mother's Labor Force Participation  
VARIABLES Work for Pay   US Work Hours 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Pre-US Work Hours 0.000032*     0.0787**   
  (1.61e-05)     (0.0367)   
Gender Inequality    0.705***     1,028** 
Index (GII)   (0.245)     (459.1) 
      
Years of Schooling 0.006 0.006   4.117 5.658 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (15.45) (14.76) 
Years Since Migration 0.025** 0.026**   53.45*** 54.11*** 
  (0.009) (0.0096)   (18.04) (18.75) 
Years Married 0.019*** 0.018***   37.70*** 35.50*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)   (12.26) (11.96) 
Spouse of US Citizen -0.153 -0.140   -212.2 -191.3 
  (0.095) (0.094)   (157.0) (167.8) 
Spouse of LPR -0.296*** -0.294***   -513.1*** -514.4*** 
  (0.084) (0.082)   (172.3) (175.2) 
Parent of US Citizen -0.240** -0.259**   -370.6 -406.8 
  (0.110) (0.0990)   (307.4) (287.4) 
Family Fourth 
Preference -0.337*** -0.338***   -470.3 -466.0 
  (0.117) (0.0997)   (322.2) (290.1) 
Employment -0.012 0.006   127.8 162.5 
  (0.105) (0.102)   (211.9) (214.8) 
Diversity -0.157 -0.122   -144.7 -88.20 
  (0.106) (0.0995)   (148.5) (160.3) 
Refuge 0.0186 0.0557   183.2 248.0 
  (0.122) (0.124)   (238.6) (242.8) 
Legalization -0.156* -0.178**   -213.9 -251.1 
  (0.091) (0.083)   (179.7) (178.3) 
N 777 777   777 777 
R-squared 0.158 0.168   0.169 0.170 
Notes: Other controls that were included in the regressions but are not listed to 
conserve space: age and age squared, child age and age squared, years since 
migration squared, world region of origin indicators, spouse age, spouse age 
squared, spouse years of schooling. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-4: Balancing Test of the Control Variables   
INDEP. VARS GII St. Error R-squared 
Child Age 1.131 (1.019) 0.017 
Child Age Squared 12.95 (14.81) 0.013 
Age 2.431 (3.602) 0.026 
Age Squared 176.7 (257.7) 0.023 
Years of Schooling -4.713 (3.413) 0.145 
Years Since Migration 6.939 (4.942) 0.098 
Years Since Migration Squared 182.5* (102.8) 0.058 
Spouse Age 7.277* (3.852) 0.031 
Spouse Age Squared 603.5* (308.2) 0.027 
Spouse Years of Schooling -3.538 (4.246) 0.122 
Years Since Migration 0.458 (2.655) 0.010 
Spouse of US Citizen 0.000473 (0.186) 0.128 
Spouse of LPR 0.0882 (0.133) 0.067 
Parent of US Citizen 0.0368* (0.0208) 0.023 
Family Fourth Preference 0.104 (0.327) 0.022 
Employment -0.127 (0.563) 0.135 
Diversity -0.710 (0.439) 0.186 
Refuge -0.243* (0.131) 0.156 
Legalization 0.635 (0.428) 0.159 
Asia -0.0475 (1.078) 0.055 
Africa 0.637 (0.417) 0.200 
Middle East 0.00959 (0.0535) 0.022 
Latin America 1.094 (0.781) 0.284 
N 777     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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